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ABSTRACT 
The development of the European Union's European Security and Defense Policy 
(ESDP) since 1998 has strongly affected the EU-NATO relationship. Starting with the 
Franco-British bilateral declaration at Saint-Malo in December 1998, the EU recognized 
the need for autonomous military capacities for actions outside NATO's framework. This 
policy challenged NATO's agreement to enhance the European Security and Defense 
Identity (ESDI) as a European pillar within NATO, as agreed at NATO's Ministerial 
Meeting in Berlin in June 1996. The tendency to establish the EU's ESDP outside NATO 
became obvious in December 1998. Two years later, in December 2000, the EU seemed 
to make considerable progress in establishing itself as a European pillar of NATO, with 
the political option of acting autonomously when the alliance as a whole is not engaged. 
As the development of the EU's ESDP between December 1998 and December 2000 
indicated, the members of the EU have put more emphasis on developing ESDP within 
the EU rather than developing ESDI within NATO. Developing the ESDP inside the EU, 
however, tends to undermine NATO's concept of strengthening the European pillar under 
the authority of the North Atlantic Council. 
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Executive Summary 
The European Union (EU) has been pursuing the development of a European 
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), while NATO has been sponsoring the emergence of 
a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). This thesis investigates the hypothesis 
that the progress of the ESDP and ESDI efforts could diminish the resources available to 
NATO by duplicating existing structures and procedures, and may exclude and thereby 
discriminate against the non-EU European members of NATO. Such developments could 
weaken the transatlantic relationship by decoupling the European pillar from the North 
American pillar of NATO. 
This thesis analyses the development of ESDP and ESDI since the historical shift 
in Britain's policy in December 1998. By systematically analyzing the EU's decisions on 
ESDP and ESDI since December 1998, this thesis identifies the implications of these 
decisions for the United States and NATO. 
The thesis argues that the ESDI/ESDP dynamic has shifted from a NATO 
framework to an EU framework, while the political impact of the United States on ESDP 
since December 1998 has been remarkably small. The EU intends to establish itself as an 
alternative to NATO for consultation and actions on European security affairs other than 
the collective defence responsibilities retained by NATO. Moreover, the EU's ESDP 
draws on critical NATO resources, assets and capabilities because NATO and the EU 
depend on almost the same forces and other military assets in Europe - that is, the 
commonly funded and maintained NATO infrastructure, including pipelines, C3I 
systems, and airfields. 
xiii 
While the United States favors the construction of ESDI within the NATO 
framework, many Europeans perceive the EU's ESDP as a process that eventually might 
lead to the defense policy of a more closely integrated EU. ESDI and ESDP therefore 
constitute a strategic and political challenge for NATO, the EU, and the United States. 
The EU and the United States must develop a common security agenda based on 
partnership, common values, and shared strategic interests rather than insisting on 
particular institutional frameworks. 
xiv 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since 1949 the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty allies have developed a 
strong and dynamic commitment in the field of European security. The United States has, 
since the end of the Second World War, supported the project of European unification. 
But at the same time the United States has made it clear that it supports the principle 
articulated in a June 1991 North Atlantic Council communique: "The Alliance is the 
essential forum for consultations among its members and the venue for agreements on 
policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of Allies under the Washington 
Treaty."1 The United States sets its own stamp on European security and defense by 
leading the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and upholding NATO's primacy. In fact, 
NATO has been for more than fifty years the institutional framework for successful 
transatlantic security policies and has proven to be the most successful defense alliance in 
modern history. 
At the end of the Cold War, the United States was the only remaining superpower, 
while the European Union has grown economically, but was still underdeveloped 
politically. Paradoxically, the strength of the United States leadership, particularly during 
the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, stimulated various political forces in the European 
Union to argue for a more dynamic process of political, economic and military 
integration including the security and defense dimension. 
1
 North Atlantic Council, communique, June 7, 1991, par. 2, quoted in David S. Yost, NATO 
Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security, (Washington DC: United States Institute 
of Peace Press, 1998), p. 209. 
1 
Since the conclusion of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1991, the member nations of 
the European Union (EU) have pursued a political process that has resulted in the multi- 
phase introduction of a single European currency for the twelve participating countries. 
This currency is based on a common European market including more than 370 million 
people. With the Maastricht Treaty, the EU moved beyond common economics and 
started to strengthen especially its second pillar, the Common Foreign and Security 
Policies (CFSP). This step has fundamentally altered the institution and can be considered 
as a milestone in the European integration process. 
The growing worldwide economic role of the EU is complemented by its 
intention to take a leading political role in international affairs. But the development of an 
effective Common Foreign and Security Policy still depends on at least two major 
factors: 
• the definition of common European Union interests beyond economic issues, and 
• the development of structures, procedures, and appropriate means to pursue and 
defend these European Union interests. 
The political value of the single European currency, the Euro, is often underestimated. 
The currency is based on the premise that common interests and common values require 
common structures, procedures and therefore must lead to a common policy. However, 
the Euro fits into the political purpose of the Union. In fact, the success of the Euro also 
depends on the effective implementation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy as 
outlined in the Treaty of Maastricht and further developed in the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
This approach also includes the development of effective common military means. 
A.        STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
In this thesis the military requirements to back the EU's CFSP are summarized 
under the term European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and are addressed under 
the term European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Though the term ESDI is used in 
a NATO context, while ESDP is employed in EU documents, both terms describe 
basically the same process, with some significant differences. The most significant 
differences concern membership (not all EU members are NATO allies, and not all 
European allies are EU members) and security and defense policy objectives. 
This thesis investigates the hypotheses: 
• the ESDP's progress may diminish the resources  available to NATO by 
duplicating existing structures and procedures; 
• it may exclude and thereby discriminate against the non-EU European members 
of NATO; and 
• it may weaken the transatlantic relationship by initiating a political process of 
decoupling the European and Atlantic pillars of NATO. 
These are precisely the concerns raised by high-level U.S. officials such as 
Secretary of Defense William Cohen and Secretary of State Madeline Albright. 
The thesis focuses on U.S. perceptions of how the EU's ESDP may affect U.S. 
national interests. This thesis further investigates changing U.S. perceptions of the EU, 
based on official assessments. The thesis identifies and analyses the major concerns of 
U.S. foreign policy vis-ä-vis ESDP/ESDI.2 This thesis furthermore examines the 
implications of the prospect that the Franco-British declaration on European security and 
defense in December 1998 will take the EU beyond what NATO agreed to in its 
ministerial meeting in Berlin in June 1996, namely to keep the ESDI within a NATO 
framework. The most significant subsequent decisions regarding the ESDP/ESDI at 
meetings of the European Council are those at Cologne (June 1999), Helsinki (December 
1999), Santa Maria de Feira (June 2000), and Nice (December 2000). This thesis 
discusses the results of these European Councils in the light of U.S. concerns about this 
process. The thesis clarifies the extent to which the European Union's approach is 
consistent with U.S. expectations and examines the points on which they differ. The 
thesis focuses on military security issues; it does not deal with the civilian police issues 
called "non-military crisis management" at the European Council in Helsinki in 
December 1999. 
B.        SIGNIFICANCE 
The question of ESDI/ESDP is of specific importance for the future relationship 
between the EU and the United States and for the future of NATO. The future 
relationship between the United States and the EU is often referred to as "The most 
important, influential, and prosperous bilateral relationship in modem times."3 In fact, 
2
 ESDI stands for "European Security and Defense Identity," the term favored in NATO, while ESDP 
stands for "European Security and Defense Policy," the term employed in the EU. The term ESDI/ESDP is 
used in this thesis to refer to the process of European security and defense arrangements generally rather 
than to a specific organizational framework. 
3
 Stuart Eizenstat, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, quoted in Marc Grossman, Assistant Secretary of 
State for European Affairs, "Building a New U.S.-European Partnership for the 21st Century," speech at the 
United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, September 14, 1999. 
within the established framework of cooperation between the EU and the United States, 
the development of the ESDI/ESDP is one of three major priorities, besides stabilizing 
Southeast Europe and managing trade relations.4 If the ESDI/ESDP develops in a way 
that challenges the future role of NATO in Europe, a new transatlantic burden-sharing 
agreement will have to be defined. There are obvious criticisms and doubts on both sides 
of the Atlantic about whether the European Union is willing to commit the necessary 
political, economic and military resources to match its rhetoric. However, further 
development of the ESDI/ESDP is of huge relevance for NATO, the EU and the United 
States. 
C.   METHODOLOGY 
The thesis is based on statements by United States officials in both the executive 
and the legislative branches of the government, as well as on agreements, treaties, 
speeches and other documents related to the ESDP/ESDI. The thesis examines U.S. 
concerns in light of the relevant decisions made by European Union authorities. The time 
framework for this comparative study focuses on the period from the Franco-British 
summit meeting in Saint Malo in December 1998 to the European Council meeting in 
Nice in December 2000. 
Ibid. 
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II. FROM BERLIN TO SAINT MALO: A STRATEGIC SHIFT IN 
EUROPEAN SECURITY INSTITUTIONS 
This chapter describes and compares the results of the Franco-British Saint Malo 
initiative of December 1998 with the prior established political arrangements relevant to 
the ESDI, which were specified in the Final Communique of the Ministerial Meeting of 
the North Atlantic Council in Berlin in June 1996. The chapter first identifies the political 
consensus agreed on ESDI in Berlin in 1996. It then explains why the 1998 Franco- 
British initiative has been of utmost importance for the increased dynamic of 
ESDI/ESDP. The main point of this chapter is that France and Britain have gone beyond 
the political acquis of Berlin by supporting the concept of autonomous military structures 
under the guidance of the EU. Consequently, the chapter concludes that the current 
development of the ESDP, following the guidelines established in Saint Malo, is no 
longer based on transatlantic "common ground," namely to establish the ESDP/ESDI 
exclusively within NATO's framework. Saint Malo seems to the starting point of a 
process to develop "separate, but not separable" capabilities. This is significant because 
the consensus achieved at NATO's January 1994 summit was that the Allies would 
"support the development of separable but not separate capabilities which could respond 
to European requirements and contribute to Alliance security."5 
5
 Declaration of the Head of States and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994, par. 6, quoted in David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The 
Alliance's New Roles in International Security (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 
1998), p. 201. 
7 
A.        NATO's ESDI-RELEVANT DECISIONS IN BERLIN IN 1996 
The NATO summit in Brussels in January 1994 approved the concept of 
Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) primarily to provide NATO with a flexible structure 
to meet the challenge of non-Article 5 crisis management operations and to include non- 
NATO members in such operations.6 The summit also approved the principle that the 
Western European Union (WEU) could draw on NATO assets and capabilities for 
operations under its leadership. In such contingencies, the North Atlantic Council would 
decide on a case-to-case basis. As with all NAC decisions, a consensus of all the Allies 
would be required.7 The intention of this decision was to increase European flexibility, 
but at the same time to keep the ESDI within the framework of the Alliance. This concept 
originally was conceived not only as an essential part of NATO's adaptation, but also 
permitted all European Allies to play a larger role in NATO's military and Command 
structures and was therefore considered to anchor ESDI within NATO. 
Two years later at the Ministerial Meeting of NATO in Berlin in June 1996, 
NATO's Foreign Ministers finally agreed to implement the Combined Joint Task Force 
concept. This step was taken primarily to overcome difficulties in establishing a 
European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance, as envisaged at the NATO 
summit in Brussels in January 1994. The political intention was to overcome concerns 
6
 For more detailed information about the outcome of NATO's summit in Brussels in 1994, and how 
this relates to ESDI, see David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International 
Security (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p. 76. 
7
 The Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 defined the WEU as an integral part of the EU's development in the 
field of defense. Although the Treaty of Maastricht did not establish a institutional link between the EU and 
the WEU, the EU defined the WEU as its military arm. It should be noted that all members of the WEU are 
also members of the EU and NATO. 
8 
that the slow progress in achieving results since the decisions in Brussels might result in a 
French-led initiative to push ESDI outside NATO's framework. 
However, in order to strengthen NATO's European pillar, the Alliance identified 
the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, as a European Commander for 
contingencies in which the WEU would conduct and led an operation. NATO also agreed 
to assign NATO Headquarters for WEU-led operations. Moreover, most important for the 
ESDI, NATO agreed to establish closer links between NATO and the WEU by providing 
access to NATO's planning capabilities, by holding common exercises, and by engaging 
in consultations on a regular basis. Nevertheless, the document did not outline a potential 
role for the EU, although the Treaty of Maastricht had established the WEU (though 
formally still independent) as the military arm of the EU in 1992. 
The main themes of the Final Communique in Berlin included NATO's mission in 
Bosnia, the structural reform of the Alliance, and the ongoing NATO enlargement 
process. Nevertheless, the Ministerial Meeting set the basic principles of NATO's 
approach dealing with the ESDI. 
The political arrangement established in Berlin is based on the following principles: 
• The ESDI will develop within NATO under the authority of the North Atlantic 
Council. 
• The ESDI will be built "within NATO, which will enable all European Allies to 
make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of 
the Alliance as an expression of our shared responsibilities."8 
• The Combined Joint Task Force Concept, introduced at the NATO summit in 
Brussels in 1994, is "consistent with the goal of building the European Security 
and Defence Identity within NATO,"9 which should increase the role of the 
European Allies within the political and military structures in NATO. 
8
 Final Communique of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Berlin, 3 June 1996, 
par. 5. 
9
 Ibid., par.7. 
• The relationship between NATO and the WEU should be developed, based on 
"full transparency" in crisis management situations.10 
• The ESDI "will be grounded on sound military principles and supported by 
appropriate military planning and permit the creation of militarily coherent and 
effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic 
direction of the WEU."11 
• The Allies agreed "to preserve the transatlantic link" and to maintain NATO as 
"the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for 
agreement on policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of Allies 
under the Washington Treaty."12 
For the first time in NATO's history, the ESDI agreement of Berlin introduced the 
principle that NATO forces, assets, and command structures could be employed by the 
Western European Union (WEU) for WEU-led operations, subject to North Atlantic 
Council decisions. NATO recognized the WEU as the political framework to increase the 
European pillar's political and military capabilities within the Alliance but at the same 
time ignored the EU. (This was consistent with the EU's designation of the independent 
WEU as its defense arm.) NATO's political intention in Berlin was to encourage 
European Allies to conduct non-Article 5 operations, using the operational and political 
framework of NATO, and "NATO capabilities, assets, and HQs and HQ elements for 
missions to be performed by the WEU."13 As in the past, NATO maintained the 
"separable but not separate" principle, order to meet the requirements of an emerging 
European Security and Defense Identity.14 
10
 Ibid., par. 7. 
1!
 Ibid., par. 7. 
12
 Ibid., par. 6. 
13
 Final Communique of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Berlin, 3 June 1996, 
par. 8. 
14
 Stanley Sloan, The United States and European Defense, Chaillot Paper 39 (Paris: Institute for 
Security Studies, Western European Union, April 2000), p.ll. 
10 
The overall political aim was to meet French demands for a stronger European 
role in NATO. The Ministerial Meeting in Berlin also marked a watershed in U.S. policy 
toward the recognition of a stronger European role in the Alliance. 
1.        Lack of Implementation 
After 1996, there was little evidence of progress in implementing NATO's 
decisions at the Ministerial Meeting in Berlin in June 1996. The established political 
acquis of Berlin has never been implemented through significant structural changes in 
NATO. 
Several issues still obstruct implementing the decisions at Berlin. These issues 
include the agreement on the modalities of EU access to NATO planning capabilities, the 
proposed pre-designation of NATO assets for operations conducted by the EU, and 
detailed solutions of the problems on the pre-designation of a European chain of 
command within NATO.15 This situation has stimulated political frustration, particularly 
in France. It has also provoked discussion with the United States as to whether the ESDI 
should be institutionalized in NATO or form part of the EU's Common Foreign and 
Security Policy.16 
After Berlin, on the other hand, the EU and the European Allies of NATO 
demonstrated a lack of political will to conduct operations in the former Yugoslavia or 
15
 Jolyon Howorth, "Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative." Survival, vol. 42, no.2, 
Summer 2000, p.43. 
16
 This discussion continued even after NATO's summit in April 1999. The adapted 1999 Strategic 
Concept addresses this issue with the following wording: "On the basis of decisions taken by the Alliance, 
in Berlin in 1996 and subsequently, the European Security and Defense Identity will continue to be 
developed within NATO. This process will require close co-operation between NATO, the WEU and, if 
and when appropriate, the European Union." North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 24 April 1999, par. 
30. 
11 
Albania under European auspices - that is, the WEU and/or the EU. In the end, only 
NATO was able to act in the former Yugoslavia, while only a few European countries 
(led by Italy) took military actions in Albania in 1997. 
2.        Findings and Conclusions 
NATO's Ministerial Meeting in Berlin in 1996 agreed that the ESDI would be 
further developed within a NATO context by implementing the principle of "separable 
but not separate" assets and capabilities available for operations under the leadership of 
the Western European Union. The Final Communique of the Ministerial Meeting did not 
mention the EU in this context. From the perspective of some French observers, the 
agreement in Berlin practically subordinated the EU's ability to conduct "Petersberg 
tasks"17 to the approval of the North Atlantic Council, which would have to approve 
"arrangements for the release, monitoring and return of Alliance assets and capabilities" 
lent to European Allies for a WEU-led operation.18 This was not in accordance with 
France's intention. In particular, this question led to an argument between France and the 
United States three years later during the drafting of the Strategic Concept in preparation 
for the Washington summit in April 1999.19 
17
 At the WEU Ministerial Council, Bonn, 19 June 1992, the WEU approved the Petersberg 
Declaration. "Apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, military units of WEU 
member States, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for: humanitarian and rescue tasks; 
peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking." Western 
European Union Council of Ministers Petersberg Declaration, Bonn, 19 June 1992, Part II, par. 4. 
18
 North Atlantic Council in Defense Ministers Session, Final Communique, 12 June 1997, par. 7, 
quoted in Yost, NATO Transformed, p. 204. 
19
 See Douglas Bereuter, 'The creation of the ESDI within the European Union: A U.S. Perspective." 
Update of a paper presented at a joint meeting of the Presidential Committee of the WEU Parliamentary 
Assembly, December 1999, text furnished by NATO Parliamentary Assembly, August 8, 2001. 
12 
However, the ESDI-relevant decisions in Berlin introduced for the first time the 
principle of European command and control arrangements within the Alliance. The North 
Atlantic Council approved the precondition for the establishment of a European chain of 
command. Critics argued that the decisions made in Berlin amounted to a step to split 
NATO into European and transatlantic parts. 
Finally, the established acquis in Berlin also reflected the U.S. dilemma in terms 
of dealing with the ESDI. In Berlin, the United States succeeded in keeping ESDI within 
a NATO framework. Three years after Berlin, the dilemma became complex when the 
EU decided to increase its own military assets and capabilities outside of NATO to deal 
with crisis management challenges and other "Petersberg tasks". Even today, the outcome 
of the Ministerial Meeting of Berlin is still relevant for interpreting the relationship 
between NATO and the EU, establishing the European command arrangements then 
envisaged, and for discussing the pending question of integrating non-NATO EU 
members in ESDI/ESDP deliberations and activities. 
However, it seems obvious that resistance (and not only in the U.S. policy-making 
community) to implementing the political-military arrangements envisaged in Berlin 
must be considered one of the primary reasons for launching the Saint Malo initiative, 
two and a half years after the Ministerial Meeting in Berlin. 
Overall, differences in outlook between the European Union and the United States 
became obvious. While the United States was looking at the ESDI as an instrument for a 
broad security approach in Europe under the leadership of NATO, many of the Europeans 
saw ESDI/ESDP as a process that might become the defense policy of a European entity. 
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NATO's decision in Berlin reflected these fundamental differences in outlook between 
many Europeans and the United States. 
B.        THE   SAINT   MALO   INITIATIVE   AND   ITS   IMPLICATIONS   FOR 
ESDP/ESDI 
During the Franco-British summit in Saint-Malo, on December 4, 1998, France 
and Britain agreed on a Joint Declaration on European Defense, initiating the so-called 
Saint-Malo process or Saint-Malo initiative. This process stipulated for the first time in 
history the prospect of autonomous military capabilities outside of NATO and under the 
leadership of the EU. The Saint-Malo process represented a major qualitative step toward 
ESDP because it also marked a major shift in British foreign policy. The British 
completely reversed their policy. London shifted from preventing the WEU from being 
incorporated into the EU to agreeing to develop capabilities for "autonomous actions, 
backed up by credible military forces."20 Although the British policy shift might have 
been predictable (in view of the statement by British Prime Minister Tony Blair in 
Poertschach, Austria, in October 1998), this step surprised the United States.21 The Saint- 
Malo declaration stipulated that the European Union must have: 
"The capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the 
means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to 
international crises."22 
"Appropriate structures and a capability for analysis of situations, sources of 
intelligence and a capability for relevant strategic planning."23 
20
 Franco-British Summit, "Joint Declaration on European Defense", Saint-Malo, 4 December 1999, 
par. 2. 
21
 High ranking British officials assured the United States that there would be no radical change in 
British foreign policy. See Douglas Bereuter, "The Creation of the ESDI within the European Union: A 
U.S. Perspective." Text furnished by NATO Parliamentary Assembly, January 8, 2001. 
22
 See Franco-British Summit. "Joint Declaration on European Defense", par. 2. 
23
 Ibid., par. 3. 
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By avoiding unnecessary duplications, the declaration called for the EU's 
"recourse to suitable military means (European capabilities pre-designated within 
NATO's European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the 
NATO framework)."24 
The Saint-Malo initiative raised strong concerns among U.S. officials. Only a few 
days after the Saint-Malo statement, Secretary of State Albright emphasized U.S. 
concerns during the December 1998 Ministerial Meeting in Brussels by reaffirming the 
U.S. support for ESDI but cautioning the Europeans against "the three D's". The three 
D's are duplication, decoupling, and discrimination. The three D's became the major U.S. 
policy guideline to express concerns about the ESDP-development after Saint-Malo.25 
Avoiding duplication means that ESDI should complement rather than duplicate NATO 
assets, capabilities and procedures. Avoiding discrimination means that ESDI should not 
isolate or exclude non-EU allies in the EU decision-making on CFSP. Avoiding 
decoupling means that ESDI should be linked to, rather than detached from, NATO 
structures.26 
1.        Findings and Conclusions 
The outcome of NATO's Ministerial Meeting in Berlin in 1996 is often referred to 
as "the common ground" between NATO and the European Union on ESDI/ESDP. The 
Saint-Malo initiative went beyond this established political acquis by calling for EU 
capacities for autonomous actions for the first time. 
24
 Ibid, par.3. 
25
 Basically the same concerns were raised by the Bush administration in the early 1990's in response 
to the Franco-German Eurocorps. See Stanley Sloan, The United States and European Defense, Chaillot 
Paper 39, (Paris: Institute for Security, Western European Union, April 2000), p.4. 
26
 Secretary of State Madeline Albright on the meaning of the three D's, quoted in Alexander 
Vershbow, "ESDI: Berlin, St. Malo and Beyond," Remarks to the Western European Union, (Paris: 
Institute for Security, Western European Union, January 28, 1999). 
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The Saint-Malo initiative has been important for two reasons. First, it has set the 
agenda for the European Union's decisions to go ahead with ESDI/ESDP. The 
development of ESDI/ESDP outside of NATO has made much more progress since 
Saint-Malo than during the two and a half years after NATO's Ministerial Meeting in 
Berlin. Second, the Saint-Malo initiative reflects an initial British-French agreement on 
fundamental principles, most prominently to develop ESDP outside NATO.27 
In June 1999, at the European Council meeting in Cologne, three years after the 
decisions made in Berlin on ESDI, the EU started to develop ESDP outside NATO's 
framework. By doing so, the European Union went far beyond the political agreement 
established at the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Berlin in 1996. However, the agreement 
to develop ESDI within NATO, laid down in the final Communique of the Ministerial 
Meeting in Brussels in 1996, can be seen as a politically unrealistic compromise: to keep 
the NATO and United State roles in Europe unchallenged and to recognize the EU's new 
role in security policy. As long as the ESDI was understood as a process exclusively 
within the framework of NATO, the development of the ESDI was strongly encouraged 
by the U.S. foreign policy agenda. The pursuit of ESDI/ESDP in a fashion that implies an 
entity autonomous from NATO and under the political direction of the EU has caused 
concern among U.S. officials. 
In other words, the current development of ESDP/ESDI is no longer based on a 
transatlantic "common ground," namely to establish the ESDP/ESDI exclusively within 
NATO's framework. The Saint-Malo initiative went beyond the established acquis at 
NATO's Ministerial Meeting in Berlin in 1996. Although Saint-Malo was a bilateral 
declaration, the most essential parts of this declaration have been integrated in major EU 
27
 See Franco-British Summit. "Joint Declaration on European Defense", par. 3. 
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declarations and strategy papers. Saint-Malo stimulated the further development of the 
ESDI/ESDP. 
C.        BERLIN VERSUS SAINT MALO 
The importance of the Saint-Malo initiative for ESDI/ESDP is that for the first 
time Britain and France could agree on fundamental principles on ESDP/ESDI. British 
foreign policy officials have been strongly committed to NATO and historically have 
perceived the ESDI as a threat to NATO, while French have taken the opposite position. 
Critics argue that it remains to be seen how far the gap between the French and the 
British approaches has been narrowed by this historic declaration.28 
The definite breakthrough in Saint-Malo was the agreement on capacities for 
autonomous actions outside the NATO framework. This wording stimulates the EU to 
prepare for operations along the entire spectrum of the Petersberg missions, if the United 
States is unable or unwilling to act. One can argue that stimulating an autonomous 
capacity outside of NATO might work as an alternative to decisions and actions 
traditionally undertaken within the NATO framework. This point especially raised major 
concerns within the U.S. legislature.29 
The major shift in British foreign policy raises the question of the future of the 
special relationship between the United States and Britain. The shift in foreign policy 
came over a year after the Labor government under Prime Minister Tony Blair took 
28
 Jolyon Howorth, "Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative," Survival, vol. 42, no. 2, 
Summer 2000, p. 34. 
29
 See 106th Congress, "European Common Foreign, Security and Defense Policy: Implications for the 
United States and the Atlantic Alliance." Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House 
of Representatives, First Session, November 10, 1999, Serial No. 106-106, p. 12. 
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office. Although some analysts argue that the reason for this shift is based on Blair's 
desire for a major European role in European affairs, most analysts would agree that the 
shift was based on strong British national interests. The British shift in foreign policy was 
to some extent predictable. Some commentators suggested that the shift resulted from 
Blair's attempt to balance Britain's refusal to join the European Monetary Union. Others 
believed that Blair simply wanted to strengthen his European credentials. Some speculate 
that an increasing role of the British armaments industry might also be a motivation for 
the British Foreign Policy shift. However, the ambiguity remains. Jolyon Howorth argues 
that the major shift in British foreign policy reflects "the British government's conviction 
that the United States will no longer automatically underwrite European security in the 
same way as during the Cold War."30 
In summary, the Saint-Malo initiative does not necessarily mean that British 
foreign policy is drifting away from its transatlantic approach. Both France and Britain 
assert that the aim of the Saint-Malo initiative is to strengthen NATO by improving the 
European pillar. On the other hand, this development raises major concerns among U.S. 
defense officials, because they realize that Britain will not continue to block the 
development of any defense capability separate from NATO. In fact, the Saint Malo 
process has to be judged over the long term. This thesis examines the results of the 
process in the two years from December 1998 to December 2000, beginning with the 
European Council in Vienna in December 1998. 
30
 Jolyon Howorth,. "Britain, France and the European Defense Initiative," Survival, vol. 42, no.2, 
Summer 2000, p. 34. 
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III.    THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL IN VIENNA AND COLOGNE 
This chapter investigates how the December 1998 Franco-British summit affected 
the outcome of the European Council meeting in Vienna later that month and explains 
why the European Council could not pay much attention to the ESDI. The chapter makes 
the point that the European Council in Vienna was the beginning of a process 
transforming what had been a NATO-centered ESDI into a European Union initiative. 
The special focus of this chapter is the outcome of the European Council in Cologne in 
June 1999. The chapter explains the significance of the Council's decision to merge the 
WEU with the EU and makes the point that this decision resulted in the establishment of 
new EU bodies, while striving to avoid duplication with existing NATO structures. 
Furthermore, the chapter examines the role of "non-EU allies"31 in the newly established 
EU decision-making structures. Overall, this chapter supports the argument that the 
European Council in Cologne was the beginning of a process of building the ESDI/ESDP 
within the European Union. The chapter's conclusion emphasizes, that with no 
institutionalized link between NATO and the EU after the European Council in Cologne, 
building the ESDI/ESDP within the EU has threatened to undermine the concept of ESDI 
as the European pillar within NATO. The EU and NATO have attempted (with only 
partial success) to deal with this difficulty, notably with their decisions in December 
2000. These decisions are discussed in chapter six of this thesis. 
31
 "Non-EU allies" means European NATO members that are not EU member states such as the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, and Turkey. It is worth mentioning that this group is identical with 
the WEU's Associate Members. 
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A.        THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL IN VIENNA 
Ending the Austrian presidency term, the European Council meeting took place in 
Vienna on 11 and 12 December 1998. Paying little attention to the ongoing discussion in 
the field of ESDI/ESDP, the Council avoided any structural decisions regarding the 
further development of the ESDI/ESDP. Drawing on the wording of the Franco-British 
declaration on European defense in Saint-Malo, the Council recognized in its final 
declaration the need to enhance the ESDI. The Council emphasized, "That in order for 
the European Union to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage, the 
CFSP must be backed by credible operational capabilities."32 However, the European 
Council did not take the initiative of introducing such operational capabilities. The 
European Council in Vienna was probably unwilling to do more to carry forward the 
ESDP process primarily because there was no common view on ESDP within the EU at 
that time and because it was generally agreed that it would be Germany's responsibility 
to seek such a common view during its presidency of the EU during the first half of 1999. 
1.        No Common View on ESDP at That Time 
Other EU members were still evaluating the British shift in European policy, 
expressed in the Franco-British declaration on European defense. Therefore it was too 
early for the Austrian presidency to frame the Franco-British initiative within the 
European Union's political arena. The Saint-Malo initiative was still fresh, and the 
consequences of the ESDP/ESDI for the EU were unclear. 
32
 See, "Presidency Conclusion", Chapter VII, Preparing the implementation of the Amsterdam 
Treaty, Vienna 11 and 12 December 1998. Available [Online]: [http://europe.euint/council/off/conclu/dec/ 
98.htrn#CVTI], January 2001. 
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However, at the time the European Council in Vienna took place, the British 
move toward including European defense and security matters within the EU might have 
been foreseeable because of Blair's political signals in October 1998 at the informal 
meeting of the European Council in Poertschach, Austria. At this meeting in Poertschach, 
the British Prime Minister officially introduced his ideas on developing European defense 
capabilities and policies within the EU. Although no official text was released, press 
reports revealed that Blair presented three solutions to develop ESDI:33 
• First, to continue to develop the ESDI within NATO 
• Second, to examine a way to merge the WEU with the EU 
• Finally, to recognize the necessity for NATO, WEU and EU to work together. 
The second time the British shift regarding European defense policy became 
obvious was at the first informal meeting of the Defense Ministers of the EU in Vienna 
on 3 and 4 November 1998. This meeting was initiated by the Austrian EU presidency. 
With the precondition that this meeting would take place informally, the EU's defense 
ministers finally accepted the invitation.34 
The Swedish minister of defense in particular expressed concern that such a 
meeting could encourage the EU to schedule meetings of the defense ministers on a 
regular basis and thereby challenge the traditional non-allied Swedish foreign policy.35 
The concerns expressed by a small non-allied EU member underscored the point that a 
33
. Background on the motivation for Blair's government to launch a European defense initiative in 
Saint-Malo are mentioned in: Assembly of the Western European Union, "WEU and European Defence: 
beyond Amsterdam." WEU Assembly Report 1626, 16 March 1999, p. 7. 
34
 This information is based on the personal experience of the author, who was involved in the 
preparations for this informal meeting. 
35
 The Swedish concerns regarding the EU's increasing role in security and defense are reflected in: 
"EU Must Not Alienate NATO," Svenska Dagbladet, Stockholm, November 22, 1999. A translation of 
excerpts from this article is furnished by The United States Mission to the European Union, Brussels, 
November 25, 1999. Available [Online]: [http://www.useu.be/issues/esdil211.hrml], October 2000. 
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common European Union view about developing a European Security and Defense 
Policy did not exist at that time, although the British shift in foreign policy was obvious. 
2. The Incoming German EU Presidency 
Another important reason for the low profile of the ESDP at the European Council 
in Vienna was the fact that Germany was designated to hold the next presidency. It was 
widely expected that Germany, as a major European power, would take credit for framing 
the outcome of Saint-Malo into a European Union perspective. During the end of the 
Austrian EU presidency, Germany was involved in a series of bi- and multilateral 
negotiations to finish a draft paper on European security and defense policy. This 
proposal was submitted to the members of the EU three months after the European 
Council in Vienna. The main elements of the proposal are identical to the wording 
employed in the final document approved at the European Council in Cologne in June 
1999.36 
3. Conclusions 
Although the shift in British policy regarding European security and defense 
policy was obvious, the European Council in Vienna was unable to frame this initiative 
into a concrete form. Instead, the European Council transferred crucial institutional 
reforms on European security and defense to the upcoming German presidency. 
36
 To compare the two documents see: NATO News and Analysis, "German Proposal on ESDI 
Unveiled, Complete Document". Available [Online]: [http://www.basicint.org/natosum6-l.htm], August 
2000, and "Presidency Report on Strengthening of the Common European Policy on Security and 
Defence." Cologne, June 3-4, 1999. Available [Online]: [http://info-france- 
usa.org/news/statements/eudef8.htm], October 2000. 
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However, by welcoming the Saint-Malo initiative, the European Council in Vienna 
marked the beginning of the EU reform on European Security and Defense Policy. 
B.   THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL IN COLOGNE 
Under the German presidency, the European Council met in Cologne in June 
1999, shortly after the 1997 agreed Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force. This treaty 
enhanced the CFSP by including the development of a Common European Security and 
Defense Policy and provided for integrating the WEU into the EU, "should the Council 
so decide."37 In addition, the Amsterdam Treaty included the Petersberg tasks among the 
EU's responsibilities. Until the Amsterdam treaty was ratified, the Petersberg tasks 
remained simply an expression of the WEU's policy.38 
Influenced by the Franco-British Saint-Malo initiative the German presidency 
took steps to endow the EU with the appropriate capabilities and structures to conduct 
crisis management operations within the framework of the Petersberg tasks. The German 
government submitted a proposal, "Strengthening the Common Policy on Security and 
Defence," at the informal foreign ministers meeting in March 1999. The proposal 
37
 See Treaty on European Union, Title V, Article 17(1). 
38
 At the WEU Ministerial Council in Bonn on 19 June 1992, the WEU approved the Petersberg 
Declaration stating that " Apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of 
the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, military units of WEU 
member States, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for: humanitarian and rescue tasks; 
peacekeeping tasks; task of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking." See "Western 
European Union Council of Ministers Petersberg Declaration," Available [Online]: 
[http://www.weu.int/eng/comm/92-petersberg.htm], October 2000. The Council also approved crisis 
management structures to pursue these tasks. 
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identified  the  EU   decision-making   structures   necessary  for   autonomous   EU-led 
operations and was based on the Franco-British Saint-Malo declaration.39 
The European Council in Cologne approved three major decisions for the further 
development of the ESDI: (1) to integrate specific functions of the WEU into the EU 
while preserving the mutual collective defense clause in Article V of the modified 
Brussels Treaty;40 (2) to introduce new decision-making bodies within the EU patterned 
after existing NATO structures; and (3) to permit non-EU NATO European allies to 
participate in EU-led operations to the fullest possible extent but without placing into 
question the decision-making autonomy of the EU. 
1.        Absorbing the Functions of the WEU 
Traditionally, the WEU played the role of a mediator between the EU and NATO. 
Having developed a modest potential for military planning, the WEU was until recently 
the only option for the EU to execute military missions under the EU's political control. 
The relevant WEU institutions have included a Permanent Council, a Military 
Committee, a Military Staff, including the Planning Cell and a Situation Center, and the 
Satellite Center.41 
39
 NATO News and Analysis, "German Proposal on ESDI Unveiled, Complete Document," Available 
[Online]: [http://www.basicint.org/natosum6-l.htm], August 2000. 
40
 Modified Brussels Treaty of 1954, Article V: "If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the 
object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military 
and other aid and assistance in their power." 
41
 For the political and military role of the WEU between the EU and NATO see " WEU and European 
Defense: Beyond Amsterdam," Assembly of the Western European Union, Document 1636, 16 March 
1999, p. 10-20. 
24 
The European Council in Cologne approved "The inclusion of those functions of 
the WEU which will be necessary for the EU to fulfill its new responsibilities in the area 
of the Petersberg tasks."42 The document further stated that "The WEU as an 
organization would have completed its purpose"43 by the end of the year 2000. This 
means that the WEU will not be absorbed wholesale into the EU. However, the Council's 
decision did not make clear which functions will be incorporated in the EU and when, or 
what will happen to the remaining functions and institutions of the WEU. 
This ambitious agenda raised major questions and set up delicate tasks for the 
upcoming EU presidencies. This agenda implied two critical issues: (a) how to handle the 
mutual defense commitment in Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty and (b) how to 
organize the future relationship between the EU and NATO. It is worth mentioning that 
after 1993, when the Maastricht Treaty entered into force, the EU used the WEU as a 
point of contact with NATO for establishing cooperative arrangements, but had no 
institutional links to NATO on its own. Merging the WEU with the EU challenges 
NATO's efforts to establish ESDI within its structure, the concept approved at NATO's 
ministerial meeting in Berlin in June 1996. These issues raised major concerns in the 
United States. From the U.S. perspective, this decision tended to move the ESDI away 
from NATO and into the framework of the EU.44 
42
 In, "European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and 
Defense," Cologne, June 3-4, 1999. Available [Online]: [http://info-france-usa.org/news/statements/ 




 See, Douglas Bereuter, House of Representative, Chairman on the Subcommittee on Asia and the 
Pacific and'Chairman of the House delegation to the North Atlantic Assembly. "The Creation of the ESDI 
within the European Union: A U.S. Perspective," Update of a paper presented at a joint meeting of the 
Presidential Committee of the WEU Parliamentary Assembly, December 1999, text furnished by NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly, August 8, 2001. 
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2.        EU and Collective Defense 
It is important to mention that the initial signatories of the Brussels Treaty decided 
to assign the military implementation of the mutual collective defense commitment 
(expressed in that treaty) to NATO. This decision was based on the expectation of the 
continuation of the U.S. commitment to defend Europe, backed by an ongoing U.S. 
military presence in Europe. 
In the execution of the Treaty, the High Contracting Parties and any 
Organs established by them under the Treaty shall work in close co- 
operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Recognizing the 
undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and 
its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for 
information and advice on military matters.45 
According to the decisions in Cologne, the collective defense commitment in 
Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty of 1954 will be preserved. This isprimarily 
because there is no consensus among the EU members to integrate mutual collective 
defense commitments within the EU. However, it is important to highlight the fact that 
this topic is still on the political agenda of the EU. This tendency illustrates the changing 
relationship between the European allies and the United States. One can interpret this 
tendency as a signal explaining the "why" of ESDP/ESDI after the end of the Cold War. 
The final document released in Cologne stated that "The different status of 
Member States with regard to mutual defence guarantees will not be affected" and that 
"The Alliance remains the foundation of the collective defense of its Member States."46 
45
 Article IV, Modified Brussels Treaty, 1954. 
46
 In, "European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and 
Defense," Cologne, June 3-4, 1999, par. 5. Available [Online]: [http://info-france-usa.org/news/statements/ 
eudef8.htm], October 2000. 
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This wording, originally from the Saint-Malo declaration,47 is open for interpretation. It 
does not necessarily mean that the WEU will cease to exist after the year 2000. On the 
other hand, preserving Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty will leave the Article V 
issue unresolved. Unless this mutual defense commitment is abandoned (which seems 
most unlikely), only two solutions are apparent: 
• First, incorporating the collective defense article of the Brussels Treaty into the 
EU, either as a separate protocol or as a common task; or 
• Second, transferring functions from the WEU to the EU in a way that collective 
defense still remains as "the last function of the WEU." 
Both options are highly controversial. Even after the European Council in Nice in 
December 2000, both are still under consideration. Including a collective defense clause 
in the EU's treaty would change the character of the legal structure of the Union and 
would bring the political diversity of the EU members, in terms of their national security 
approaches, to an end. It is well known that Austrian neutrality or a Swedish non-allied 
policy is not consistent with the concept of collective defense. However, resistance to 
embracing collective defense within the EU treaty remains. At he same time, major WEU 
members do not wish to relinquish the collective defense clause of the Modified Brussels 
Treaty, as the Saint-Malo agreement indicates. In addition, including collective defense in 
the EU treaty would result in "back door security guarantees" for those EU members that 
47
 Franco-British Summit, "Joint Declaration on European Defense", Available [Online]: [http://info- 
france-usa.org/news/statements/pr/stmalo.litm], October 2000. 
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are not NATO members.48 The problem of "back door security guarantees" already exists 
within the WEU in that full membership is only recognized in conjunction with NATO 
membership. This is because NATO was responsible for honoring the mutual collective 
defense clause of the WEU. However, regarding the ESDI/ESDP development, the 
question of "back door security guarantees" for non-NATO members of the EU remains a 
serious U.S. concern.49 
3.        Framing the Relationship with NATO 
To transfer most of the WEU's functions to the EU also raised the question of 
how to transform the well-established relationship between the WEU and NATO into a 
relationship between NATO and the EU. 
Based on the decisions taken in Berlin in 1996, NATO approved a series of 
arrangements allowing the WEU access to NATO assets and capabilities. These 
arrangements cover the assignment of a European strategic commander (in practice, the 
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, known as DSACEUR) for WEU-led 
operations, the selection of NATO headquarters, and the adaptation of the CJTF concept, 
in order to ensure more flexibility for a European chain of command within NATO.50 
48
 Elmar Brok, Member of the European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Common 
Security and Defense Policy, argued in the Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House 
of Representatives, in Washington, November 1999, that "Due to the internal situation of such neutrals and 
non-allied countries, it is with difficultly that they go directly to any defense alliance. But if we put Article 
V [Brussels Treaty] into a protocol of the EU treaty, then it would be a easier after a time of cooperation on 
that basis, that such counties individually sign up for membership, which I think would be in our common 
interest." In this context Brok mentioned Sweden, Finland and Austria. In Hearing before the Committee on 
International Relations House of Representatives, 106th Congress, First Session, November 10, 1999, Serial 
No. 106-106, p. 14. 
49
 Ibid., p. 14. 
50
 See Frank Kramer, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, "Transcript: 
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Recently, the two organizations have established close links, particularly in planning, 
consultation, and exercises. Most important for ESDI, NATO and the WEU agreed on a 
framework paper for the release and return of Alliance assets and capabilities.51 
These agreements have to be translated into specific agreements, creating an 
institutional link between NATO and the EU. However, the EU declaration released in 
Cologne calls for "the development of effective mutual consultations, cooperation and 
transparency between the European Union and NATO."52 The decisions in Cologne 
raised the question of how such a new EU entity would link up to NATO. Cologne set the 
terms of this discussion. 
In fact, the EU in Cologne approved separate EU decision-making structures, and 
thereby ignored the "political acquis"53 of an established relationship between the WEU 
and NATO in order to ensure "the capacity for autonomous actions." 
4.        Duplication of NATO Structures and Decision-Making 
In order to ensure political control and strategic direction of EU-led operations the 
Presidency Report identified the need to approve the following new political and military 
bodies:54 
Kramer on NATO-EU Defense Planning", Roundtable on DoD views concerning NATO-European Union 
defense planning, Washington, October 18, 2000, p. 4. Available [Online]: 
[http://www.useu.be/issues/kraml018.htm], October 2000. 
51
 See, "The Washington Summit Communique: An Alliance for the 21st Century," Washington D.C., 
24 April 1999, par. 8. Available [Online]: [http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/New/statement3.htm], October 
2000. 
52
 "Presidency Report on Strengthening of the Common European Policy on Security and Defence", 
Cologne, June 3-4, 1999. Available [Online]: [http://info-france-usa.org/news/statements/eudef8.htm], 
October 2000. 
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Regular (or ad hoc) meetings of the General Affairs Council, as appropriate, 
including defense ministers. 
A permanent body in Brussels (the Political and Security Committee) 
consisting of representatives with political and military expertise. 
An EU Military Committee consisting of Military Representatives making 
recommendations to the Political and Security Committee. 
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Fig. 1:  EU and NATO Parallel Structures 
53
 The term "political acquis" means all the political achievements of an entity or organization. 
54
 In, "Presidency Report on Strengthening of the Common European Policy on Security and 
Defence," Cologne, June 3-4, 1999. Available [Online]: [http://info-rrance-usa.org/news/statements/ 
eudef8.htm], October 2000. 
30 
Comparing the new EU decision-making bodies with those of NATO makes 
obvious the duplication of existing NATO structures. Duplicating NATO's decision- 
making bodies is not a new phenomenon in European security policy. The political and 
military structure of the WEU has always been a duplication of NATO structures and 
procedures, to a certain extent.55 This process of duplication even accelerated after the 
EU defined the WEU as its military arm to conduct crisis management operations, as 
specified in the Maastricht Treaty. 
However, unlike the EU decision in Cologne, the United States did not criticize 
this duplication extensively. One of the reasons why the United States reacted differently 
to the duplications was the impression that the decisions in Cologne might create an 
ESDI within the EU and decoupled from NATO, while the role of the WEU as the 
European pillar of NATO had always been clearly defined.56 The WEU political-military 
structures and the structures established by the European Council in Cologne had in 
common a lack of capabilities. Without such capabilities, the EU's ability to conduct 
autonomous actions is limited. 
55
 Although the Brussels Treaty, as modified in 1954, explicitly recognized in Article IV the 
undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, and indicated that the WEU would rely on the 
appropriate military authorities of NATO, an increasing amount of structural duplication was undertaken 
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Bereuter, "The Creation of the ESDI within the European Union: A U.S. Perspective." Update of a paper 
presented at a joint meeting of the Presidential Committee of the WEU Parliamentary Assembly, December 
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Aware of these shortfalls, the European Council in Cologne identified two types 
of EU operations:57 
• EU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities, and 
• EU-led operations without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. 
In conclusion, the new structures envisaged by the EU in Cologne in fact 
duplicated key political-military structures in NATO. Such duplications also exist within 
the WEU. However, the establishment of the EU's decision-making bodies concealed the 
lack of capabilities to make these structures operational. Today the EU still depends on 
NATO's capabilities to conduct its "autonomous" operations in European security and 
defense contingencies. 
Aware of these shortfalls, the European Council identified the need to develop 
further the EU's forces, including headquarters. The Council also defined a set of main 
characteristics for such European capabilities: "Deployability, sustainability, 
interoperability, flexibility and mobility."58 These general objectives are shared by 
NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative, approved at the Alliance's Washington summit 
in April 1999. 
To increase the capabilities became the focus of the next six-month period of EU 
deliberations, held under the Finnish Presidency. However, by approving political and 
military structures parallel to those in NATO, the EU in Cologne introduced a new 
approach to ESDI: to start to establish ESDP/ESDI in the framework of the EU. 
57
 "Presidency Report on Strengthening of the Common European Policy on Security and Defence," 
Cologne, June 3-4, 1999, par.4. Available [Online]: [http://info-france-usa.org/news/statements/ 
eudef8.htm], October 2000. 
58 "Presidency Report on Strengthening of the Common European Policy on Security and Defence", 
Cologne, June 3-4,1999. 
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5.        The Relationship to Non-EU NATO European Allies 
The relationship between NATO and the EU is closely linked to the issue of 
integrating non-EU NATO European allies into the decision-making bodies of the EU. In 
order to conduct EU-led operations, the EU relies on arrangements with NATO for the 
use of the Alliance's assets and capabilities, as agreed at NATO's ministerial meeting in 
June 1996 and in the Washington summit decision of April 1999.59 However, 
implementing these decisions depends on the consensus of all NATO members, non-EU 
Allies included. 
The Cologne declaration calls for "satisfactory arrangements ... to ensure their 
[European NATO members] fullest possible involvement in EU-led operations, building 
on existing consultation arrangements within WEU"60 but without placing into question 
the EU's decision-making autonomy on matters of principle and policy. The EU also 
approved the principle that "all participants in an EU operation will have equal rights in 
that operation."61 
This wording does not answer all the questions associated with non-EU NATO 
European allies participating in the decision-making process in an EU-led operation. 
Non-EU European NATO Allies still insist on the right of equally participating in all 
aspects of such operations, including the decision-making by the European Council. 
59
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According to the decision made by the Council in Cologne, the EU will consider 
equal participation of non-EU European NATO allies only after the European Council 
autonomously has made a decision to conduct an operation. The European Council might 
then invite non-EU NATO European allies to participate with rights equal to those of EU 
members. This text basically laid down the EU's position on the relationship between the 
EU and non-EU NATO European allies. This position was not changed by the decisions 
of the European Council in Nice in December 2000. This underlines, like no other 
question, the consistent approach of the EU in dealing with non-EU European NATO 
allies. 
Nonetheless, despite the decisions of the Council in Cologne, the problem of 
equal participation of non-EU NATO European allies still exists. As long as the EU lacks 
capabilities and depends on access to NATO assets and capabilities to conduct EU-led 
operations, non-EU NATO Allies have the right to block NATO decisions crucial for the 
EU's access to NATO capabilities. On the other hand, such a tendency might encourage 
the EU to focus on developing its own capabilities. 
C.       FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN QUESTIONS 
The European Council in Vienna avoided any decisions on structural changes in 
ESDP/ESDI. The primary reason for this low profile was that the British shift in 
European security and defense policy was being discussed among the members of the 
EU. However, by welcoming the Saint-Malo initiative, the European Council marked the 
beginning of the EU's reform on European security and defense policy. 
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The European Council in Cologne in June 1999 enabled the EU to construct the 
necessary structure to conduct crisis management operations and "to play a full role on 
the international stage." 
The Council's decision to absorb key functions of the WEU into the EU by the 
end of the year 2000 challenged the established relationship between NATO and the 
WEU. However, drawing on the Saint-Malo declaration, the Council emphasized that the 
mutual defense guarantees laid down in Article V of the Brussels Treaty, as modified in 
1954, should be maintained, even after the WEU's institutional functions had been 
transferred to the EU. This perspective could imply "back door mutual defense 
guarantees" for the EU countries which are not members of NATO or create various 
levels of EU membership: for example, those committed by mutual defense guarantees on 
one side, and the other EU members on the other side. 
According to the decisions in Cologne, the participation of non-EU NATO 
European Allies in EU-led operations should be based on "satisfactory arrangements ... 
to ensure their fullest possible involvement," but without placing into question the EU's 
autonomy in the decision making process. 
The main outcome of the European Council in Cologne was the approval of 
political decision-making structures designed to parallel corresponding NATO structures 
in order to ensure an autonomous decision-making capacity for the EU. At the same time 
these structures lack capabilities to make it operational. Consequently, the question of 
how to develop and improve capabilities became the EU's focus after Cologne. 
In conclusion, the European Council in Cologne was the beginning of a process 
establishing ESDI/ESDP within the EU. The European Council in Cologne did not 
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establish an institutional link to NATO, nor did the Council define how to integrate non- 
EU NATO European allies into the new structures. However, the Council also avoided 
promising equal participation by non-EU members in the decision making process. The 
outcome of the European Council in Cologne concerning ESDI/ESDP questions was 
therefore distinct from the concept of framing ESDI/ESDP within NATO, as approved in 
Berlin in June 1996 by the North Atlantic Council. 
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IV.    THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL IN HELSINKI: A BROADER 
POLITICAL CONTEXT 
This chapter discusses the decisions of the European Council in Helsinki in 
December 1999. The Council introduced a common European "headline goal" and 
"collective capability goals" to acquire the means necessary for EU-led operations. This 
chapter also explains how this major EU initiative relates to European experiences during 
the 1999 Kosovo campaign, NATO's Operation Allied Force. Furthermore, this chapter 
evaluates the headline goal and supports the conclusion that projected EU-led forces will 
probably be incapable of performing the upper spectrum of the Petersberg tasks, despite 
the improvements expected in 2003, when the EU headline goal is to be attained. 
The European Council in Helsinki also initiated the EU defense planning process, 
which is probably the most disturbing issue from the perspective of the United States and 
other non-EU members of NATO. The chapter therefore contrasts the defense planning 
process in NATO with the projected defense planning process in the EU and explains 
why this issue is of utmost importance. Finally, the chapter compares the EU's headline 
goal with NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative to indicate the overlapping character of 
these initiatives. Overall, the chapter investigates the emphasis of the EU on developing 
bilateral and multilateral means to enhance European capabilities, as suggested in the 
bilateral French-British summit at Saint-Malo and other European declarations. The 
conclusions reveal the importance of establishing a reliable relationship between the EU 
and NATO in order to avoid (a) unnecessary duplications of efforts and (b) divisions 
among the EU nations and the non-EU members of NATO, such as Turkey and the 
United States. 
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A.       LESSONS LEARNED FROM KOSOVO 
Even though Operation Allied Force in the Kosovo conflict was a success, the 
campaign also highlighted the gap in capabilities between the European Allies and the 
United States. In this particular case, the European Allies were not able to play a more 
prominent role because they lacked the capabilities to support such ambitions. The 
Europeans recognized that U.S. airplanes undertook the most demanding missions, 
simply because these were the only available aircraft capable of flying at night and in any 
weather.62 Elmar Brok, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, 
and Security and Defence Policy of the European Parliament, summarized the lessons 
Europeans drew from the conflict in the former Yugoslavia: 
What we have learned from Kosovo and from the whole Yugoslavia 
conflict is that with proper European capacities, we should have avoided 
war in the very beginning and the loss of many, many lives in this region 
before the shooting started in the beginning of the 1990's. I think this is 
our main concern: to get capacities to prevent such wars. We can only 
prevent them if we have enough military capacity to show that we can also 
use military instruments.63 
NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson pinpointed another aspect, 
equally important for the development of the ESDI. He summarized: 
62
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Defense Policy of the European Parliament Hearing before the Committee on International Relations House 
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The Kosovo air campaign demonstrated just how dependent the European 
Allies had become on US military capabilities.64 
However, while NATO's experience in Kosovo strengthened NATO's unity, it 
simultaneously gave impetus to efforts undertaken by major EU members to create an 
autonomous ESDP within NATO. Indeed, the French Minister of Defense, Alain Richard, 
crystallized the final conclusion for Europe: 
It is also true during the [Kosovo] crisis that some Europeans experienced 
a slight frustration by not being able to contribute militarily up to the level 
of the political stakes for Europe. Indeed, they do not wish to find 
themselves in the same position if a new crisis were to arise.65 
However, the frustrating European experience during the Kosovo campaign, 
coupled with U.S. political dominance, may have provoked the EU to launch the 
initiative to increase the EU's capabilities for autonomous military and non-military 
actions. Focusing on capabilities became the major task of the EU after the decision in 
Cologne in June 1999, when they chose to incorporate political and military decision- 
making bodies within the EU. 
B.        FOCUSING ON CAPABILITIES 
While the focus of the European Council in Cologne was on introducing decision- 
making bodies, the European Council in Helsinki was focused on capabilities, in 
particular the introduction of the headline goal and collective capability goals. 
64
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After the European Council in Cologne, the United States was concerned because 
of its impression that the new structures implied acting outside the Alliance whenever 
possible, rather than through the Alliance. The European Council's decision to endorse 
the headline goal and collective capability goals six months later in Helsinki reinforced 
the United States concerns. From a U.S. point of view, the EU's headline goal and 
collective capability goals could imply the development of separate requirements for the 
same forces. Such a process could lead to incompatibility between NATO's defense 
planning and the EU's defense planning, as envisaged by the European Council in 
Helsinki, and could therefore contribute to a division between the EU and the United 
States. 
However, since the EU introduced a process which may lead to a separate EU 
defense planning system, establishing the proper link between the EU and NATO has 
become the most important strategic question of ESDI/ESDP development. Some 
European nations (France in particular) are reluctant to encourage developing such a 
relationship. Some EU states feel that the EU should complete its internal restructuring 
process before turning to this matter. Others think that cooperation with NATO 
automatically means submission to U.S. defense policy.66 As a matter of fact, neither the 
European Council in Cologne nor the European Council in Helsinki established a proper 
EU-NATO relationship on the strategic-political level. The same problem exists on the 
operational level with regard to questions such as linking NATO's DCI with the EU 
headline goal. This relationship became of utmost importance after the EU Council in 
66
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Helsinki. If NATO's ESDI and the EU's ESDP develop with complementarity, these 
initiatives will reinforce each other; if not, they could create two standards for the same 
forces. 
1.        The Approval of Headline Goals 
The key to ESDI/ESDP success is the improvement of capabilities. By 
introducing headline goals and collective capability goals, the European Council in 
Helsinki invented capability requirements in order to prepare for EU-led operations. 
The Council approved: 
To develop European capabilities, Member States have set themselves the 
headline goal: by the year 2003, cooperating together voluntarily, they will 
be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range 
of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most 
demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000- 
60,000 persons). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the 
necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other 
combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval 
elements. Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level 
within 60 days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response elements 
available and deployable at very high readiness. They must be able to 
sustain such a deployment for at least one year. This will require an 
additional pool of deployable units (and supporting elements) at lower 
readiness to provide replacements for the initial forces.67 
This ambitious plan introduced by the European Council raises the following 
important questions: Will the EU be able by the year 2003 to employ these forces to meet 
the requirements for missions similar to KFOR or SFOR? In order to meet these 
requirements will the EU draw on forces assigned to NATO to conduct an EU-led 
operation? Will the EU introduce an autonomous defense planning process? If so, how 
67
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will such a process be linked to NATO? Above all, will the EU be willing to establish a 
proper relationship with NATO before EU structures are settled? 
However, by setting the headline goal and collective capability goals, the EU took 
the first step to establish the capabilities needed to make ESDP operational. Whether this 
approach will be successful or not remains to be seen. 
2.        Headline Goal -Quality Versus Quantity 
The headline goal suggests that by 2003 the EU should be able to deploy 50,000 
to 60,000 persons for a sustained operation of one year or more in order to accomplish the 
Petersberg tasks, including the most demanding missions.68 The operational force should 
enable the EU to pursue missions like KFOR in Kosovo or SFOR in Bosnia. Some 
experts predict that the EU might take over the lead from NATO in KFOR or SFOR, once 
these requirements are fulfilled.69 
However, there are doubts about the vagueness of the headline goal and about the 
quantity of forces specified in it. Critics question whether this number of forces is 
68
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sufficient to meet the requirements of undertaking sustained operations like KFOR or 
SFOR because the 50,000 to 60,000 troops include command, control and intelligence 
capabilities, logistics, other combat support and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval 
elements. 70 According to Yost and Heisbourg, these logistics and support elements 
necessary would reduce the actual deployable number of combat troops to a level 
between 20,000 and 30,000 persons, which is a significantly lower level than NATO has 
deployed in Kosovo. (The strength of the NATO forces in Kosovo has been as high as 
52,000.)71 However, this number of deployable forces does not include a 3:1 force ratio 
for the purpose of rotation, and therefore the number of forces might be even lower than 
30,000 to 20,000. Based on the total figure of 50,000 to 60,000 troops deployable and for 
a sustained operation, an additional interpretation of these figures seems also possible. To 
deploy this number of forces in the field the available number of forces to sustain an 
operation for at least one year might easily go up to 200,000 due to rotation, logistic 
support and other factors. However, this interpretation of the headline goal might go 
beyond the capacity of EU members to provide for an EU-led operation. 
This critique about the headline goal is valid. The European Union nations do 
have a significant number of forces, but currently face the problem of deploying and 
sustaining these forces abroad. One of the reasons for these problems is the declining 
defense spending in NATO Europe (and the EU) and the capabilities gap between the 
70
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United States and the European Allies.72 In fact, the number of forces for EU-led 
operations envisaged in the headline goal strongly supports the conclusion that the 
current EU ability for crisis management is primarily focused on the lower scale of the 
Petersberg spectrum. 
However, it has to be mentioned that the deadline to meet the headline goal is the 
year 2003. By that time the major EU countries will have completed their ongoing 
reforms of the armed forces in order to improve their power projection capabilities. 
Britain and France have undertaken major efforts to adapt their armed forces. Britain's 
Strategic Defense Review, launched in 1998, has emphasized the need to increase 
Britain's capabilities for expeditionary operations, including deployable headquarters for 
command, control, communications and intelligence. This includes joint logistics support 
and strategic lift, for which London has initiated numerous procurement projects.73 
France has followed the same path. According to an ambitious six-year plan introduced in 
1996, France will be able by the year 2002 to assign as many as 100,000 personnel to 
missions outside France. With this pool of 100,000 personnel, France intends to 
contribute up to 50,000 personnel for any major regional conflict.74 Similar programs are 
in place in Germany, Italy and other countries. Indeed, there is a Europe-wide tendency to 
shift from a conscript system to a professional one, and from territorial defense to 
interventionary capabilities. On the other hand, accomplishing the upper range of the 
72
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Petersberg tasks is not only a matter of manpower; it also requires weapons, transport, 
C3I, and other equipment. This is the reason why the development of a European 
industrial base for procurement is paramount to the development of an autonomous 
European capability for ESDI/ESDP. This point has been highlighted in each EU 
document since Saint-Malo relevant to the development of ESDI/ESDP. 
As a matter of fact, restructuring the armed forces of the major European 
countries has been based primarily on political considerations. This has been true in 
particular true for France but also for Britain, as reflected in the Strategic Defense 
Review. It is not clear how the process of restructuring the armed forces contributed to 
the idea of inventing an autonomous EU defense capability. In fact, France started this 
process in 1996 and Britain followed in 1998 with the Strategic Defense Review. Both 
states plan to have the necessary interventionary capabilities by the year 2003, a deadline 
mentioned also at the European Council in Helsinki. 
In fact, the EU's headline goal reveals the current gap between available 
capabilities for EU-led operations and the EU's political intentions. However, the success 
of the process outlined by the EU has to be judged by its long-term results. Until the EU 
requirements are met, the EU will depend on NATO's ability to cover the upper spectrum 
of the Petersberg tasks. 
74
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3.        Establishing a European Defense Planning Process 
Regarding EU defense planning, the European Council in Helsinki approved the 
following vague approach to this issue: 
The General Affairs Council, with the participation of Defence Ministers, 
will elaborate the headline and capability goals. It will develop a method 
of consultation through which these goals can be met and maintained, and 
through which national contributions reflecting Member States' political 
will and commitment towards these goals can be defined by each Member 
State, with a regular review of progress made. In addition, Member States 
would use existing defence planning procedures, including, as appropriate, 
those available in NATO and the Planning and Review Process (PARP) of 
the PfP. These objectives and those arising, for those countries concerned, 
from NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) will be mutually 
reinforcing.75 
According to this text, defense planning will be part of the EU's structural 
abilities. As with NATO's defense planning, the text implies a two level system, with 
defense planning in the EU General Affairs Council and in the participating countries. 
The document refers to a "regular review process," yet indicates that "the commitment 
towards these goals can be defined by each member state". This vague wording implies 
the establishment of an EU defence planning process, but does not define structures. Nor 
did the European Council define the participants in this process, or the relationship to 
NATO's defense planning structure. 
However, this ambiguity might reflect France's desire to establish an EU defense 
planning process to counterbalance its absence from NATO's corresponding structures.76 
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In fact, the text does not foresee institutional links between NATO and EU defense 
planning but emphasizes the mutually reinforcing character of NATO's DCI and the 
EU's headline and collective capability goals. 
Finally, the European Council in Helsinki initiated an EU defense planning 
process but did not define whether this process will be separate from NATO procedures 
or institutionally linked.77 Linking the EU's defense planning to the corresponding 
process in NATO became a priority for the upcoming presidencies. 
4.        Headline Goals and DCI 
The Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) was approved in April 1999 at NATO's 
Washington summit. The intent of the DCI was to increase NATO's defense capabilities 
"through improvements in the deployability and mobility of Alliance forces, their 
sustainability and logistics, their survivability and effective engagement capability, and 
command and control and information systems."78 Comparing the DCI with the EU's 
headline goal reveals similarities, but there are also major differences: 
The headline goal is part of the EU's defense policy. The EU's headline goal is 
based on the conclusions drawn by the WEU in evaluating available assets and 
capabilities for the entire spectrum of Petersberg tasks, including the most demanding 
77
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missions.79 The WEU conclusions on necessary capabilities made a central contribution 
to the EU's decisions in Cologne80 in June 1999 and in Helsinki in December 1999 to 
define specific requirements. 
As regards military capabilities, Member States need to develop further 
forces (including headquarters) that are suited also to crisis management 
operations, without any unnecessary duplication. The main characteristics 
include: deployability, sustainability, interoperability, flexibility, and 
mobility.81 
As part of the NATO defense planning process, the DCI covers the whole 
spectrum of NATO's missions, Article 5 objectives82 included, while the EU's headline 
goal concerns the Petersberg spectrum, excluding collective defense requirements 
because this task remains NATO's responsibility. 
In addition, the DCI includes requirements, such as "defences against cruise and 
ballistic missiles and against chemical and biological weapons," which the headline goal 
does not mention.83 However, DCI requirements are more demanding and broader than 
the EU headline goal. For the eleven EU countries in NATO, the EU's headline goal and 
NATO's DCI affect the same forces and are, according to the conclusions drawn in 
79
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Helsinki, mutually reinforcing. Secretary of Defense William Cohen recognized the 
overlap between the DCI and the headline goal when he pointed out: 
As long as it is understood ... that this [the headline goal] is done within 
the context of having a European capability that will strengthen NATO 
itself, there is no ground for this speculation that somehow, this is leading 
to a division between Europe and the United States.84 
However, the development of EU defense planning capabilities will serve as an 
indicator: Either this process will be established simultaneously in close cooperation with 
NATO in order to avoid unnecessary duplications or the process will lead to separate EU 
defense planning structures. 
5.        Defense Planning in NATO versus Defense Planning in the EU 
Defense planning generally is based on strategic and political goals,* defining 
common strategic requirements (including common capability goals). One of the aims of 
the defense planning is to introduce an advisory process to harmonize national defense 
plans. Although this process lacks any formal enforcement mechanism, it has a strong 
impact on the national level.85 
At present, NATO is the only multinational European security organization 
capable of defense planning. Defense planning in NATO exists on three levels: strategic 
84
 William Cohen, Press Conference at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium on December 2, 
1999. Text furnished by the United States Mission to the European Union. Available [Online]: 
[http://www.useu.be/issues/esdil202.htrnl], October 2000. 
85
 A detailed explanation of how NATO's force planning interacts with the national level and how 
force goals are interlinked with the DCI may be found in "Draft interim Report: The Defence Capabilities 
Initiative and NATO's Strategic Concept", NATO Parliamentary Assembly Report AT-245-DSC-00-5, 
Committee on Defence and Security, Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities, October 
2000. 
49 
defense planning, force planning, and operational planning.86 Each is described below in 
relation to the EU's headline goal: 
• Strategic defense planning in NATO is a biennial process, in which the defense 
ministers agree on Ministerial Guidance containing the priorities for the defense 
planning process. The EU has comparable institutions in the European Council 
and the General Affairs Council (including the defense ministers), as established 
in Cologne in June 1999. 
• Based on the Ministerial Guidance, NATO then agrees upon Force Goals in 
coordination with its member states in a two-level process. On the basis of these 
force goals, member states harmonize their national defense plans in order to 
provide the needed capabilities. The DCI affects the definition of Force Goals. 
This is important because the 58 DCI items and the EU headline goal are 
interrelated in terms of their objectives, to improve "deployability, sustainability, 
interoperability, flexibility and mobility."87 In addition, the Planning and Review 
Process (PARP) of the PfP links NATO's PfP Partners to the force planning 
process, because 80% of the Partnership Goals defined in the PARP are related to 
DCI items.88 However, at this level NATO Force Goals and the EU headline goal 
86
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are overlapping. This is the institutional level where the link between the defense 
planning capabilities of NATO and the EU come together. 
•    The third level is operational planning, which is basically contingency planning. 
How the EU will conduct its defense planning process is probably the most 
critical issue affecting the NATO-EU relationship. If the EU introduces its own defense 
planning at all three levels in order to meet its headline and collective capability goals, 
defense planning within the EU might become separate from NATO's defense planning 
procedures and goals. Alexander Vershbow, the Permanent U.S. Representative on the 
North Atlantic Council, stressed the importance for the EU and NATO to cooperate in 
this field: 
If NATO and the EU do not work together on defense planning, it could 
lead to competing or even conflicting priorities being given to member 
nations in the two organizations. The consequence could be a weakening 
of the Alliance's overall capacity to deal with major crises, together with 
new political frictions in the trans-Atlantic relationship. An EU that 
divides Europe, weakens NATO and creates new strains with Washington 
will not be a stronger EU. And it will likely not achieve the credible 
capacity to manage crises that is the reason for developing ESDP in the 
first place.89 
The EU still relies on NATO structures in defense planning. Therefore, major 
issues in relations between the EU and NATO include "assured access to NATO planning 
capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations"90 and "the 
89
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presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common 
assets for use in EU-led operations."91 The basic decision to provide such assured access 
to NATO's planning capability was made at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Berlin 
in 1996, and was reaffirmed at the NATO Summit in Washington in 1999.92 The question 
of assured access to NATO's planning capabilities is linked to the question of equal 
participation by non-EU NATO European allies in the EU's decision-making structures 
regarding ESDP. 
However, fulfilling the headline goal means either to establish a defense planning 
process within the EU or to rely on NATO's capability. Nevertheless, there is also a third 
possibility based on a two-level system between NATO and the EU. While the EU and 
NATO would define the common strategic goals in the defense planning process, the 
development of force planning goals would be carried out by NATO. The designated 
headquarters are able to carry out contingency planning. Although the European Council 
in Helsinki did not further develop practical arrangements between NATO defense 
planning and the projected EU defense planning, the Council did not rule out such a 
possibility. The Council's approach to defense planning underlined the need for the 
establishment of proper relations between NATO and the EU. 
91 ibid. 
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6.        Developing Parallel Military Structures and Capabilities 
To develop the "capacity for autonomous actions, ... backed up by credible 
military forces"93 requires a certain amount of duplication, particularly in decision- 
making structures. The European Council in Cologne and in Helsinki established 
political-military structures but made sure that these structures were very limited in 
strength and resources. Limited to approximately 60 people, the EU's military staff is not 
capable of operational planning or comparable to the staff at the headquarters of NATO's 
European Strategic Command, SHAPE. Aware of this shortfall, NATO has identified 
SHAPE as the operational headquarters for EU-led operations.94 However, Cologne and 
Helsinki defined a political-military structure to ensure the EU a minimum of 
autonomous decision-making capacity. 
The central issue in the discussion on duplicating NATO assets is not about 
political-military structures, but about capabilities, particularly capabilities outside of 
NATO. In fact, the Saint Malo Declaration of December 1998 stressed the importance of 
"suitable military means (European capabilities pre-designated with NATO's European 
pillar or national or multinational European means outside of NATO framework)."95 
Since then, the European Council has repeatedly emphasized the perspective of using 
such national or multinational European means outside of NATO, in order to enhance the 
EU's capacity for autonomous actions (when NATO as a whole is not engaged). This 
93
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tendency is important, because the EU has started to focus on available national and 
multinational capabilities outside of NATO in order to make the EU operational. 
Based on the findings of the WEU,96 EU members have undertaken considerable 
efforts to develop their national and multinational means in order to enhance such 
capabilities and to put them at the service of the European Union. As pointed out by the 
European Council in Helsinki, member states have decided "to develop rapidly collective 
capability goals in the field of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport, 
areas also identified by the WEU audit."97 
To highlight the trend to focus on national and multinational assets for EU 
operations, France's Defense Minister, Alain Richard, identified four major projects in 
this field: 
(1) In order to strengthen our capability for informed decision-making, we 
could agree among willing Europeans to undertake, in close coordination 
with the EU, the collective mobilization of surveillance and early warning 
assets. Exploitation of these assets would be undertaken on a national 
basis, with a disposition for pooling our evaluations. 
(2) To reinforce our European capabilities for command and control, 
France and the United Kingdom have made public their willingness to 
authorize the use of their combined structures by the EU, as well as the 
possibility of welcoming other European elements in these structures. This 
step aims to put multinationalised command capabilities at the service of 
the EU. 
(3) Likewise, it is our responsibility, for those of us who are engaged in 
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European multinational forces, to carry on the transformation and 
strengthening of command capabilities at the tactical level. 
(4) Finally, as our fourth objective, we must progress, among willing 
Member States, toward the creation of an airlift command and, as we 
Dutch and French suggest, a European cell for maritime strategic 
transport, in order to eventually coordinate the common use of overall 
available military assets and the potential use of civilian assets.98 
Nevertheless, the European Council in Cologne and Helsinki established limited 
political-military structures to ensure a minimum of autonomy in EU's decision-making 
process. However, regarding duplication, two critical issues follow. First, at the political- 
military level, the EU still lacks strategic planning capabilities and therefore relies on 
NATO. This will continue as long as the EU chooses not to establish a political-military 
body comparable to SHAPE and capable of strategic defense planning. The second 
critical issue is establishing an EU military chain of command. So far, the EU has 
avoided establishing such a parallel structure. The major concerns regarding EU 
duplication are not about the new political-military structures, but about assets and 
capabilities. 
In a process initiated by the Franco-British Saint-Malo declaration, the EU has 
started to shift its attention from available capabilities within NATO to national and 
multinational means outside NATO. 
Aware of the EU's limited resources on the strategic level, major European 
nations have concentrated their efforts on the operational and tactical level by enhancing 
national and multinational means and by making these means available for EU-led 
98
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operations. Qualitative enhancement of national and multinational capabilities became a 
major goal on the EU's agenda. 
The European Council in Helsinki was thus a watershed for the development of 
ESDI/ESDP. However, the following questions remain as unfinished business: 
1. How to establish a mechanism for the relationship between the EU and NATO. 
2. How to link NATO defense planning with the EU. 
3. How to secure EU access to NATO's operational planning. 
4. How to include non-EU NATO European allies in ESDI/ESDP decision-making. 
C.        FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Operation Allied Force, NATO's air campaign in the Kosovo conflict, revealed 
the capabilities gap between the European Allies and the United States in modern 
warfare. This frustrating European experience and the political dominance of the United 
States encouraged the EU to launch a major initiative preparing for EU-led operations. 
The headline goal, introduced at the European Council in Helsinki, called for a 
force up to 60,000 persons, available by the year 2003 and capable of accomplishing the 
full range of Petersberg tasks, the most demanding tasks included. In addition, the 
headline goal introduced quality requirements for the troops in order to meet the entire 
Petersberg task spectrum. The headline goal represented the lowest common denominator 
among the EU member states at that time. Analysts question whether these requirements 
are sufficient to establish an autonomous EU capacity for crisis management 
contingencies. 
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The number of forces specified in the headline goal seems insufficient to cover 
the upper scale of the Petersberg tasks. Although the EU nations have a significant 
number of forces, the EU currently faces the problem of deploying and sustaining these 
forces abroad. In fact, the number of forces envisaged for EU-led operations strongly 
supports the conclusion that the EU's projected capability for crisis management is 
primarily focused on the lower end of the Petersberg spectrum. This might encourage a 
perception of a division of labor between NATO and the EU." 
The question of shared defense planning by the EU and NATO has probably been 
the most critical issue of ESDI/ESDP since the European Council in Helsinki. If these 
two processes are not linked, conflicting priorities between these two organizations could 
ensue. However, the European Council in Helsinki established a vague EU defense 
planning procedure, similar to that of NATO. To introduce defense planning procedures 
within the EU might reflect France's desire to counterbalance its absence from NATO's 
corresponding structures. The vague EU efforts might have been intentional and might 
underscore the reservations of other EU members about fulfilling challenging headline 
and collective capability goals. 
The EU's headline and collective capability goals and NATO's DCI basically 
follow the same idea, namely to strengthen capabilities for modern warfare; but they are 
also different. While the headline goal is based on crisis management tasks, the DCI is 
part  of NATO's  collective  defense planning process  and  also  covers  Article  5 
99
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requirements. For the eleven EU countries in NATO, the headline goal and the DCI serve 
the same forces. According to the conclusion drawn by the EU in Helsinki, the headline 
goal and the DCI should reinforce each other. In fact, however, the European Council in 
Helsinki established the headline goal without an institutional link to NATO. 
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V.      THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL IN FEIRA 
This chapter focuses on the European Council's decisions regarding the CFSP and 
ESDP made in Santa Maria de Feira in June 2000. The chapter highlights the two most 
crucial ESDP-related issues of this Council: first, the EU-NATO relationship and second, 
the decision to set up a "single inclusive structure" defining the institutional framework to 
deal with the participation of "third countries" in EU crisis management, including non- 
EU European NATO countries. Analyzing the link between these two important issues, 
the chapter makes the point that the EU almost ignored the concerns articulated by non- 
EU European NATO members concerning their participation in the EU's decision- 
making process. 
The chapter concludes that the Council in Feira did not resolve the contradicting 
policy priorities of the EU: (a) gaining assured access to NATO's assets and capabilities 
and (b) establishing the EU's autonomy in all aspects of the decision-making process, 
because it did not deal effectively with the special status of non-EU European NATO 
members. Establishing the EU's decision-making autonomy took priority over the EU's 
commitment to integrating non-EU European NATO allies into the decision-making 
process to the fullest possible extent, as envisaged by the North Atlantic Council in 
Washington in April 1999 and by the European Council in Cologne in June 1999. 
Nevertheless, the European Council in Feira was mostly about institution building 
and set the framework for the EU-NATO agreement, which was to be finalized during the 
upcoming French presidency. 
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A.       PREPARING FOR EU-NATO RELATIONSHIP 
Based on a mandate from the previous presidency, the European Council in Feira 
agreed on five principles regarding EU-NATO relations and introduced four "ad hoc 
working groups" dealing with specific EU-NATO topics. These five principles are: 
The relationship between EU and NATO "must take place in full respect of the 
autonomy of EU decision-making."100 
The Council agreed to develop the relationship with NATO in order "to achieve 
full and effective consultation, cooperation and transparency"101 and to base the 
EU objectives in the field of military capabilities on the principle of mutual 
reinforcement. 
While underlining the mutually reinforcing character of NATO and EU efforts 
regarding crisis management, the Council also stressed the different nature of the 
EU and NATO and made clear that the existing procedures governing WEU- 
NATO relations would not be automatically transferred into the EU-NATO 
arrangements. Based on the existing procedures established between the WEU 
and NATO, the European Council expressed its intention to make an assessment 
"with a view to their possible adaptation to an EU-NATO framework."102 
The Council reaffirmed that the EU and NATO will deal with each other on the 
basis of an equal footing. 
In the arrangements and modalities for relations between the EU and NATO, 
"there will be no discrimination" against any member state of the EU or NATO. 
The European Council also decided to propose to NATO the establishment of four 
"ad hoc working groups" in preparation for a permanent arrangement between NATO 
and the EU. The ad hoc working groups cover the following topics:103 
The ad hoc working group for security deals primarily with preparations for the 
security arrangement between NATO and the EU. This security arrangement 
100 see "Strengthening the Common European Security and Defense Policy - Presidency Report to the 








should lead to "access by designated officials from the EU and its Member States 
to NATO planning structures."104 
The ad hoc working group for defining capability goals and appropriate 
structures and procedures intends to develop modalities for consultations with 
NATO to ensure that the EU's capability and headline goals and NATO's 
Defense Capabilities Initiative are mutually reinforcing. 
The ad hoc working group on enabling EU access to NATO assets and 
capabilities, as approved by the North Atlantic Council in Berlin in 1996 and in 
Washington in 1999, concentrates on concluding an agreement on the necessary 
modalities. 
The fourth ad hoc working group focuses on the definition of permanent 
arrangements between the EU and NATO, which will be necessary once the EU 
changes its interim bodies into permanent structures. 
In summary, each of the EU's principles for the EU-NATO relationship 
emphasizes the high priority the EU places on its own autonomy regarding the decision- 
making process in crisis management. At the same time, the topics of the established 
working groups indicate that access to NATO's assets and capabilities (including 
planning capabilities) is of utmost importance for the EU in order to ensure the 
effectiveness of the EU's crisis management operations. However, there is an obvious 
conflict between the established EU priority of autonomy in decision-making and the 
EU's dependence on NATO's assets and capabilities. 
B. PARTICIPATION OF NON-EU EUROPEAN NATO MEMBERS 
Regarding the participation of non-EU European NATO member states in EU-led 
operations, the Council repeated the status defined in the Helsinki document without 
additional mandates: 
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Upon a decision by the Council to launch an operation, the non-EU 
European NATO members will participate if they so wish, in the event of 
an operation requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. They 
will, on a decision by the Council, be invited to take part in operations 
where the EU does not use NATO assets. 
Other countries who are candidates for accession to the EU may also be 
invited by the Council to take part in EU-led operations once the Council 
has decided to launch such an operation.105 
This text is identical to the Helsinki wording and indicates that the European 
Council was not willing to extend the right of participation for non-EU European NATO 
countries as defined in Helsinki. This is remarkable because any large-scale EU-led 
operation will require assets and capabilities from NATO. As Alexander Vershbow, U.S. 
Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, has pointed out: 
EU members should not expect to get those assets [from NATO] if they 
have sought to exclude the non-EU Allies from having input into the 
shaping of the policy leading up to that operation.106 
This underlines once again that the EU's desire to establish its autonomy in the 
decision-making process was a higher priority than the fullest possible integration of the 
non-EU European NATO allies in the EU decision-making leading to crisis management 
operations. It is important to mention that the legal position of third-country participation 
in EU-led operations goes beyond what NATO foresees for non-NATO states 
participating in non-Article 5 operations. As Karsten D. Voigt, the German Foreign 
Ministry's Coordinator for German-American Cooperation, has pointed out, "although 
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the second sentence of paragraph 20 and paragraph 25 [of the Presidency Report to the 
Feira Council] do not express this with sufficient precision, structures will be created that 
will permit consultations with these states ahead of every Council decision regarding 
operations."107 
Alexander Vershbow has also clarified the linkage between two of the most 
important questions on ESDP/ESDI, which are the EU-NATO relationship and the 
integration of non-EU European NATO allies in the EU decision-making regarding crisis 
management.108 
As a matter of fact, Turkey has blocked the EU's demand for assured and 
automatic access to NATO planning capabilities while France, arguing that it is 
imperative to avoid unnecessary duplications, has agreed to use NATO planning 
capabilities for EU-led operations. Ironically, the Turkish blockade endangers the EU- 
NATO relationship and encourages major EU states to duplicate NATO planning 
structures within the EU.109 
The EU's policy and priorities revealed an unsolved contradiction. On the one 
hand, the EU depends on the support of all NATO members, non-EU European allies 
included, for its assured access to NATO assets and capabilities. On the other hand, the 
EU has not indicated sufficient political flexibility to guarantee non-EU European NATO 
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allies a special status within the EU decision-making process leading up to EU-led 
operations. 
C.       ESTABLISHING AN INCLUSIVE STRUCTURE 
To ensure dialogue, consultation and cooperation with non-EU European NATO 
members and candidates for the accession to the EU, the European Council in Feira 
established a "single, inclusive structure."110 According to the Council's decision, this 
structure had to be based on appropriate arrangements dealing with security and defense 
policy-related issues. 
The European Council in Feira decided to establish a political consultation body 
attached to the EU's CFSP structures. This forum consists of the nine candidates for 
accession to the EU111 and the six non-EU European NATO members.112 This "single, 
inclusive structure," as described by the European Council, would harmonize the ESDP 
with the "reinforced political dialogue" carried out between the EU and the candidates for 
accession to the EU. 
This new "forum for EU-related security" will meet in the format of EU+15 at 
least twice during the six-month term of each presidency. European non-EU NATO 
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members will meet in addition to the EU+15 format two times per presidency in the 
EU+6 format. Meetings will take place on various political and military levels with the 
corresponding EU structures. Within both formats (EU+15 and EU+6) the exchange of 
information will include elaborating the headline and capability goals to improve 
European military capabilities. 
One of the most noteworthy aspects of this new CFSP/ESDP structure is related to 
the status of non-EU European NATO members. All six non-EU European NATO 
members are losing the special status they have enjoyed within the WEU as Associate 
Members. As a matter of fact, their status in the new EU consultation structures does not 
go significantly above what other EU partners like Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, Romania and 
other partners enjoy. 
D.        FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
The European Council in Feira established a set of principles for EU-NATO 
relations. These principles were based on the EU's pursuit (a) of autonomous decision- 
making regarding crisis-management operations vis-ä-vis NATO and (b) access to NATO 
assets and capabilities, including planning capabilities. The North Atlantic Council, 
including the non-EU European NATO members, was asked to confirm the principle of a 
presumption of EU assured and automatic access to NATO's assets and capabilities. Yet, 
non-EU NATO members (Turkey in particular) indicated that their approval of EU use of 
NATO assets and capabilities would depend on the extent to which the EU was willing to 
include these countries in the decision-making process leading to EU-led operations. 
Ironically, the reluctance of non-EU European NATO members (Turkey in particular) to 
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confirm the principle of a presumption of EU assured and automatic access to NATO's 
assets and capabilities has caused some observers in the EU to think about building up 
such structures within the EU. 
As a matter of fact, the European Council in Feira did not consider the concerns 
of the non-EU European NATO members. The EU established an EU-only decision- 
making process, in case of a decision leading to an EU-led operation (with or without EU 
use of NATO assets and capabilities). This clearly indicates the EU's shift of priority, 
favoring the EU's autonomy in decision-making rather than integrating non-EU European 
NATO members in the process. In addition, the European Council in Feira established a 
single inclusive structure, attached to the CFSP bodies, including the non-EU European 
NATO members and the candidates for accession to the EU. This means that all six non- 
EU European NATO members are losing the special status they have possessed within 
the WEU as Associate Members. Their status is not significantly greater than that of other 
EU partners. 
This new forum, comparable to NATO's Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 
(EAPC), deals with EU-related security issues and is attached to the EU's CFSP 
structure. The forum will be involved in elaborating the headline and capability goal, as 
articulated by the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999. Although the success 
of this forum depends on the overall success of the CFSP, this development could 
contribute to task sharing with NATO's EAPC, as a broader transatlantic security 
institution, while the EU could focus on EU-related crisis management. 
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VI.    ESDP/ESDI: STATUS QUO 
AFTER THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL IN NICE 
This Chapter summarizes the status quo of the ESDP/ESDI, including the 
decisions of the European Council in Nice in December 2000. The EU Council took place 
under a French presidency, two years after France and Britain launched the Saint-Malo 
initiative, thereby inaugurating a process to enhance European capabilities for crisis 
management. In Nice, the EU member states could assess how far this initiative had gone. 
The Council in Nice was essential to the ESDP/ESDI because the European Council 
approved a proposal for the "Permanent Arrangements for EU-NATO Consultation and 
Cooperation,"113 including the arrangement "On the implementation of Paragraph 10 of 
the Washington Communique" which refers to: 
(a) "Assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute 
to military planning for EU-led operations;" 
(b) "The presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO 
capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations;" 
(c) "Identification of a range of European command options for EU-led 
operations, further developing the role of DSACEUR;" 
(d) "The further adaptation of NATO's defense planning system to 
incorporate more comprehensively the availability for forces for EU-led 
operations."114 
This EU proposal was important because it underlined the EU's dependence on 
NATO assets and capabilities and nonetheless revealed the intention of the EU to deal 
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with crisis management in an EU context rather than in a NATO context. NATO's 
Foreign Ministers supported this EU proposal in general terms a few days after the 
European Council in Nice.115 
This chapter analyzes the EU's intention to use NATO assets and capabilities to 
the fullest possible extent while stressing its autonomy in the political decision-making 
process vis-ä-vis NATO. 
A.       THE NEW POLITICAL-MILITARY STRUCTURES OF THE EU 
The European Council in Helsinki in December 1999 introduced interim political- 
military bodies within the EU's structure, which became operational in March 2000. In 
December 2000, the European Council in Nice integrated these political-military bodies 
into its CFSP as permanent structures, in order to enable the EU to conduct EU-led 
operations. These new bodies are: 
• The Political and Security Committee (PSC), 
• The European Union Military Committee (EUMC), and 
• The European Union Military Staff (EUMS). 
The newly established bodies are to some extent a duplication of the political- 
military structures of NATO. Very limited in numbers and resources, the EUMC and the 
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ksa 
EUMS   are  designated  to  consult  and  cooperate  with  the  corresponding  NATO 
structures.116 
B.       THE EU'S POLITICAL-MILITARY STRUCTURES DEPEND ON NATO 
The Military Staff is the key element for EU's ability to pursue the full range of 
the Petersberg tasks. Responsible for "early warning, situation assessment and strategic 
planning for Petersberg tasks," the EUMS is also responsible for the "identification of 
European national and multinational forces."117 The European Council in Nice thus 
imposed a huge responsibility on the EUMS, which relies on limited resources and a 
relatively small number of personnel. Pointing out these high expectations, the European 
Council in Nice stated: 
The European Union Military Staff, which will acquire an initial operating 
capability in the course of 2001, will bolster the European Union's 
collective early warning capability and will provide it with a predecisional 
situation assessment and strategic planning capability.118 
As a matter of fact the EUMS is currently not able to conduct any strategic 
defense planning or force planning tasks. Until the EUMS becomes operational, the EU 
must depend on NATO's ability to perform these tasks. For that reason, the European 
Union Military Staff is organized to have structures and procedures compatible with 
116
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those of NATO.119 The following paragraph, part of the "Standing Arrangements For 
Consultation and Cooperation Between the EU and NATO,"120 highlights the EU-NATO 
relationship and indicates how the EUMS depends on external planning capabilities: 
At the request of the PSC, the EUMC will instruct the European [Union] 
Military Staff to determine and prioritize the strategic military options. 
Having determined the initial general options, the Staff may call on 
external planning sources, in particular the guaranteed access to NATO 
planning capabilities, to analyze and refine these options.121 
The statement on the permanent arrangements for EU-NATO consultation and 
cooperation is even clearer in pointing out the EU's dependence on NATO planning 
capabilities: 
The EU would reiterate the importance which it attaches to being able, 
when necessary, to make use of the assured access to NATO's planning 
capabilities and to count on the availability of NATO's assets and 
capabilities as envisaged in the Communique from the Washington 
Summit. The European Union will call on NATO for operational planning 
of any operation using NATO assets and capabilities. When the Union 
examines options with a view to an operation, the establishing of its 
strategic military options could involve a contribution by NATO's 
planning capabilities.122 
This statement indicates that the EU intends to rely on NATO planning 
capabilities even for autonomous military operations without recourse to NATO assets 
and capabilities. Until the EU's new political-military structures become capable of 
119
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operational planning (in 2001 these structures should acquire an initial operating 
capability, as envisaged by the European Council in Nice), the EU intends to rely 
primarily on NATO's strategic planning and force planning capabilities. For low- 
intensity operations within the Petersberg task spectrum, the EU has the capacity for 
contingency planning, using available European headquarters and means on the strategic, 
operational and tactical levels.123 
In sum, the limited ability of the newly established political-military bodies 
reflects a European dilemma. Because of their limited resources, and in particular their 
inability to execute defense and force planning, the political-military bodies of the EU 
cannot function effectively without the corresponding NATO structures. Progress in this 
field depends on the future resources available to the EUMS.124 On the other hand, on 
several occasions the European Council has expressed a strong desire to be able to carry 
out autonomous EU-led operations along the full scale of the Petersberg missions without 
relying on NATO's capabilities. 
C.        ASSESSING THE EU'S DECISION MAKING AUTONOMY 
According to the European Council in Nice, a European Union Military Staff 
should be able to carry out strategic operational planning as part of the EU's decision- 
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making process.125 As pointed out, at present the EUMS is only able to pursue 
operational planning by using NATO capabilities, such as intelligence and other national 
and multinational means, to come up with strategic military options for EU operations.126 
In other words, the European Union's decision-making process has to rely on NATO's 
capabilities. This places into question the EU's ability to establish an autonomous 
decision-making process, because the EU's process has to draw on capabilities and 
information from outside its institutional framework. 
D.        CAPABILITIES - QUANTITY VERSUS QUALITY 
Numerically, the EU has sufficient forces at its disposal to cover the full range of 
the Petersberg missions. According to the Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration, 
the EU also has sufficient national and multinational headquarters at strategic, 
operational, force and component levels.127 
Nevertheless, the Commitment Conference, held in Brussels on 20 November 
2000, also identified specific shortfalls in quality.128 However, according to the decisions 
of the EU Council, the EU should be prepared to exercise political control and strategic 
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management for EU-led operations with or without recourse to NATO assets and 
capabilities until 2003, as envisaged by the European Council in Helsinki. 
E. DRAWING      ON      NATO'S      PRE-IDENTIFIED      ASSETS      AND 
CAPABILITIES 
The North Atlantic Council, including non-EU European NATO allies, must still 
approve the availability of pre-identified assets and capabilities. Pre-identified assets will 
be available for EU-led operations unless NATO has to conduct an Article 5 operation or 
non-Article 5 operation "which has been given priority after consultation between the two 
organizations."129 This means that the EU's access to NATO assets and capabilities still 
depends on NATO's case-by-case approval. Nevertheless, the pre-identification of 
specific NATO assets and capabilities provides the EU with a perspective sufficient for 
generic strategic planning possibilities. 
F. NON-EU EUROPEAN NATO MEMBERS 
The guiding principle of the European Council in dealing with "non-EU European 
NATO allies and candidates for accession to the EU"130 is to ensure the decision-making 
autonomy of the European Council. Consultations between the EU and the non-EU 
European countries are based on a consultation arrangement during non-crisis periods 
129 see "Presidency Report on the European Security and Defence Policy," " Annex to the Permanent 
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within a "single inclusive structure." The European Council in Nice approved a process 
of intensified cooperation with the EU during an emerging crisis, including the possibility 
of participating in an EU-led operation. If the EU conducts an operation autonomously, 
the European Council may choose to invite non-EU European NATO members to 
participate. If the EU requires recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, non-EU 
European NATO members have the right to participate in the operation. 
All the States that have confirmed their participation in an EU-led 
operation by deploying significant military forces will have the same 
rights and obligations as the EU participating Member States in the day-to- 
day conduct of such an operation.131 
To manage the day-to-day activities during an EU-led operation the Council in 
Nice envisaged a Committee of Contributors, parallel to but distinct from corresponding 
EU structures. This ad hoc Committee of Contributors will comprise all EU Member 
States and the "non-EU European allies and candidate countries deploying significant 
military forces under an EU-led operation."132 
Overall, non-EU European NATO allies and the candidates for accession to the 
EU face the following political restrictions: 
• They are not invited to participate in the initial decision-making process which 
could lead to an EU-led operation, with or without recourse to NATO assets 
and capabilities. 
131
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• Once their contributions to the EU-led operation are accepted, they still will 
not have direct access to EU decision-making structures. Their contributions 
will be organized within a Committee of Contributors, outside the EU, yet 
attached to EU permanent structures. This structure will be parallel to but 
distinct from the corresponding EU structures. Even if the EU uses NATO 
assets and capabilities, non-EU European NATO members will have to deploy 
"significant military forces" to enjoy the same rights as EU participating 
member states. 
In fact, from an institutional point of view, participation for non-EU European 
NATO allies in EU-led operations will be rather limited. This is likely to affect the 
relationship between the EU and NATO, particularly with regard to EU-led operations 
that depend on access to NATO assets and capabilities. As a matter of fact, the EU 
depends on NATO to pursue the füll spectrum of the Petersberg tasks. Therefore, the 
relationship between the EU and NATO is crucial for the development of ESDI/ESDP, 
and the question of guaranteed access to NATO's planning capabilities is particularly 
important. 
G.       THE EU's RELATIONSHIP TO NATO 
Probably the most important step in the development of NATO's ESDI and the 
EU's ESDP since Saint-Malo was the Council's approval of a standing arrangement 
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between the EU and NATO in Nice in December 2000.133 This arrangement still has to 
be approved by the North Atlantic Council, yet the document reveals the intention of the 
European Council to develop the ESDP within the EU's framework. This conclusion is 
based on the following observations: 
• For EU-led operations with and without recourse to NATO's assets and 
capabilities, the European Council instructed the European Union Military Staff to 
"call on external planning sources, in particular the guaranteed access to NATO 
planning capabilities."134 This underscores the fact that currently military 
planning of any kind will remain, according to the will of the European Council, 
the responsibility of the European Union Military Staff, while NATO is only 
supposed to provide guaranteed permanent access to its planning capabilities.135 
• Once the North Atlantic Council has approved the release of assets and 
capabilities for an EU-led operation, "The entire chain of command must remain 
under the political control and strategic direction of the EU throughout the 
operation, after consultation between the two organizations. In that framework the 
operation commander will report on the conduct of the operation to EU bodies 
only."136 
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• For an EU-led operation calling on NATO assets and capabilities, the European 
Union authorities will appoint a designated operational commander. His 
responsibilities are to draw on necessary NATO planning capabilities and to 
specify the predetermined assets and capabilities for the military operation in 
close coordination with NATO personnel. During this process, the arrangement 
approved by the European Council defined the role of the DSACEUR as a 
"strategic coordinator" between the two organizations in order "to satisfy EU 
requests."137 Nevertheless, NATO perceives DSACEUR as serving a key function 
within the concept of ESDI; he is responsible for the European chain of command 
within NATO's structure.138 
The EU's political approach to relations with NATO indicates that the EU intends 
to develop the ESDP/ESDI not only under the EU's political control and strategic 
direction but also within its own framework distinct from NATO. 
H.        FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Force and defense planning is critical for the EU in order to enhance its 
autonomous capabilities, including an autonomous decision-making process. To meet 
these expectations, the ability of the EUMS is central. Part of the new EU structure, the 
EUMS is not designed to provide the EU with autonomous decision-making capability, 
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nor is the EUMS capable of defense planning or force planning. The EUMS is designed 
to cooperate with the corresponding NATO structures. 
According to the European Council in Nice, this might change in 2001. This date 
is critical because the force goals approved in Helsinki foresee that in 2003 the EU should 
be able to conduct the full range of the Petersberg tasks with or without NATO assets and 
capabilities. 
Numerically, the EU has sufficient forces at its disposal. The EU also has 
sufficient national and multinational headquarters at strategic, operational, force and 
component levels.139 However, shortfalls in availability, deployability, sustainability, and 
interoperability, and in the field of C3 and strategic mobility have been identified.140 
Because of such shortfalls in available capabilities for EU-led operations, the relationship 
between the EU and NATO remains essential. The North Atlantic Council, including 
non-EU NATO European allies, must still approve pre-identified NATO assets and 
capabilities for EU-led operations. 
Non-EU European NATO allies face the problem that their right to participate in 
EU decision-making structures is rather limited. The European Council set up permanent 
consultation arrangements for interactions with non-EU European NATO Allies and 
candidates for the accession to the EU. The EU's approach might affect the EU-NATO 
relationship, if EU-led operations should draw on NATO assets and capabilities because 
139
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of the limited access of non-EU European NATO allies to EU decision-making 
structures. 
Probably the most important part of the "Nice Declaration" is the Permanent 
Arrangement for EU-NATO Consultation and Cooperation, laid down in Annex VII of 
the document. Although the North Atlantic Council has yet to approve this document, it 
highlights the overall tendency of the European Council to develop the ESDP/ESDI 
under the EU's political control and strategic direction within its own framework. 
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VII.     CONCLUSIONS AND THE WAY AHEAD 
In economic terms, the United States and the European Union (EU) share the 
largest two-way trade and investment relationship in the world. In political terms, the 
United States-EU relationship is "The most important, influential, and prosperous 
bilateral relationship of modern history."141 The issue of ESDP/ESDI is an essential part 
of this relationship. The United States has always encouraged its European allies to 
assume a larger proportion of responsibility by improving their military capabilities and 
pursuing economic and political integration. Nevertheless, the recent and dynamic 
development of the EU's ESDP outside NATO's framework has unexpectedly challenged 
United States foreign policy. The United States considers the ESDI an instrument for 
broader transatlantic security under NATO's umbrella, backed by U.S. leadership, but 
many Europeans perceive the EU's ESDP as a process that eventually might lead to the 
defense policy of a more closely integrated EU. Most of the ESDI/ESDP controversy 
between the EU and the United States is rooted in these fundamental differences in 
perceptions. 
The development of the EU's ESDP since 1998 has strongly affected the EU- 
NATO relationship. Starting with the Franco-British bilateral declaration at Saint-Malo, 
the EU recognized the need for autonomous military capacities for actions outside 
NATO's framework. 
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This policy challenged NATO's agreement to enhance the ESDI as a European 
pillar within NATO, as agreed at NATO's Ministerial Meeting in Berlin in June 1996. 
The tendency to establish the EU's ESDP outside NATO became obvious in December 
1998. Two years later, in December 2000, the EU seemed to make considerable progress 
in establishing itself as a European pillar of NATO, with the political option of acting 
autonomously when the alliance as a whole is not engaged. As the development of the 
EU's ESDP between December 1998 and December 2000 indicated, the members of the 
EU have put more emphasis on developing ESDP within the EU rather than developing 
ESDI within NATO. Developing the ESDP inside the EU, however, tends to undermine 
NATO's concept of strengthening the European pillar under the authority of the North 
Atlantic Council. 
The EU's decision to absorb specific functions of the WEU raises the question of 
how to transform the well-established relationship between NATO and the WEU into a 
relationship between NATO and the EU. Between December 1998 and December 2000, 
the EU obviously hesitated to create a proper political relationship with NATO while 
building an EU structure for autonomous actions. For the first time, an institutional 
framework for this relationship was approved by the European Council in Nice at the end 
of the French presidency in December 2000. At that time, the central issue no longer 
focused on EU defense structures but on the available capabilities. Defining the EU- 
NATO relationship, therefore, was mostly about capabilities. In fact, capabilities will 
remain the key to the success of the ESDP. 
Establishing permanent political-military structures within the EU is widely 
recognized as necessary to enable the EU to conduct autonomous crisis management 
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operations even if this leads to duplication of decision-making structures. In fact, these 
new EU political-military structures are so limited in resources and personnel that they 
must coordinate their activities with corresponding NATO structures. This dependence 
raises questions about the ability of the EU to conduct an autonomous political decision- 
making process and to conduct autonomous operations. The future capability of the 
European Union Military Staff to conduct its tasks autonomously may be a major catalyst 
for the ability of the EU to perform EU-led operations. This is particularly true for 
strategic defense planning and force planning. 
The European Council in Helsinki was extremely important for the ESDP because 
of its decision to establish interim political-military structures with the necessary 
operational capabilities. Duplicating political-military decision-making structures, as 
decided in Cologne, will not necessarily challenge NATO's role, but the decision to 
establish European headline goal and capability goals could challenge NATO. Defining 
such specific goals and setting a timetable for their achievement could confront NATO, 
in particular the United States, with unexpected developments and a new direction for the 
ESDI. This is true because for the first time in history NATO may be challenged to 
compete with the EU for the same forces and the same European assets. Above all, the 
European Union's goals call for an EU strategic defense-planning capability, including 
European force planning. The question of the relationship between NATO and the EU's 
defense planning appears to be the most critical ESDI/ESDP issue after the European 
Council in Helsinki. Focusing on capabilities rather than on political-military structures 
represented a new tendency regarding the ESDP's development. Generally, the decisions 
to provide the EU with military capabilities initiated a process that necessitated 
83 
arrangements to draw on existing NATO capabilities and procedures simply because 
there were no significant additional assets and capabilities in Europe available other than 
those already assigned to NATO. 
The EU set the political agenda to prioritize its autonomous decision-making 
capacity. To ensure the EU's political autonomy in relations with NATO became a 
political dogma for all structural and institutional decisions regarding ESDP in the period 
between December 1998 and December 2000. This has had a major impact on the 
relationship with non-EU European NATO allies. In fact, the European Council in 
Cologne established a second-class status for non-EU European NATO allies in that these 
countries cannot participate on the same level as EU member states in EU decision- 
making processes under the ESDP. The fact that the EU intends to develop a specific 
mechanism of consultation with non-EU European NATO members does not change the 
established principle of EU-members-only decision-making. The only significant 
exception resides in the arrangement for an ad hoc Committee of Contributors for the 
day-to-day management of a specific operation. 
Indeed, the ESDP development has almost ignored the special status of non-EU 
European NATO allies vis-ä-vis the EU. This indicates that the political impact of the 
United States on the development of the ESDP has been remarkably small. According to 
the European Council, non-EU European NATO allies will not participate in the initial 
EU decision-making process leading to an EU-led operation. This is true even if the EU 
has to use NATO assets and capabilities, and even if non-EU European NATO allies will 
contribute to such an operation with significant military forces. These limitations 
regarding  the  participation  of non-EU  European  NATO  allies  were  established 
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immediately after the Saint-Malo declaration in December 1998 and have not been 
reversed since then. This point especially indicates that the EU considers its decision- 
making autonomy of utmost priority in the ESDP process. 
The EU decided to establish a security consultation body parallel to but distinct 
from the corresponding new ESDP structure including non-EU NATO European allies 
and candidates for accession to the EU. This might shift the dialogue on European 
security issues with EU partners from the EAPC to the EU. The EU has stimulated a 
political tendency to develop the ESDP as a primary instrument for crisis management in 
a European Union framework rather than in a transatlantic context. 
In sum, to ensure a limited ability for autonomous political-military decision- 
making, the EU has established new political-military bodies. Because of its limited 
resources, primarily in the field of strategic defense planning and Command, Control, 
Communications and Intelligence (C3I), the EU still relies on NATO. As long as the EU 
does not establish a body capable of strategic planning similar to SHAPE, and does not 
introduce an EU military chain of command, the level of duplication will not challenge 
NATO militarily. Nevertheless, there is a tendency among major EU states to focus on 
national and multinational means outside of NATO in order to enhance the EU's 
capability to conduct EU-led operations. This tendency encourages the collective 
mobilization and pooling of EU assets and capabilities and will influence the national 
priorities of the participating countries. 
However, after two years of increased and dynamic efforts regarding institutions, 
the ESDP process must deal with the question of available capabilities to back the 
political will for autonomous military actions. Concluding that only NATO has the 
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operational ability to deal with all aspects of crisis management is too easy. Such a 
conclusion would not recognize that ESDP is primarily a political process, and that the 
availability of the necessary assets and capabilities is ultimately a decision about 
political-military priorities. It is true that Europe is confronted with an capability gap in 
crucial operational areas. But it is also true that meeting the Helsinki headline and 
capability goals offers major incentives for key EU states competing for a leading role in 
European security affairs. 
Nevertheless, the ESDP is at a turning point in the history of the EU. If the ESDP 
project fails, it will jeopardize the CFSP of the EU and jeopardize the EU's role in world 
affairs, including the transatlantic link. It is, therefore, necessary to develop a common 
transatlantic security agenda based on partnership, common values, and shared strategic 
interests rather than insisting on various institutional frameworks. 
86 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1.   Defense Technical Information Center  
8725 John J. Kingman Road, Suite 0944 
Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6218 
2. Dudley Knox Library  
Naval Postgraduate School 
411 Dyer Road 
Monterey, CA 93943-5101 
3. Professor David S. Yost  
CodeNS/YO 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5101 
Colonel Tjarck Roessler  
CodeNS/RT 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5101 
5. Dr. Alexander Moens  
Department of Political Science 
Simon Fräser University 
Burnaby, BC, Canada, V5A 1S6 
6. LTC Gert R. Polli  
Huetteldorfer Strasse 126 
1140 Vienna 
Austria/Europe 
87 
